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Abstract
These are perilous times for American democracy. Among the threats, many point
to the power of corporations. This article examines that threat by considering a series of
dualisms characterizing the relationship between corporations and democracy.
This begins with a look at the anti- as well as the pro-democratic impacts
of the earliest corporations and the paradoxes with respect to democracy created during
the evolution of corporate law. The article then looks at internal corporate governance
(so-called “corporate” or “shareholder democracy”) to show how, on the one hand, it
contains features addressing some of the greatest current threats to American democracy,
while, on the other hand, it operates as a fundamentally undemocratic vote buying system.
This dualism in internal corporate governance, in turn, reflects a clash in the purpose for
corporate or shareholder democracy: Is the purpose economic efficiency, or is it democratic
legitimacy for those controlling the often-vast power of the corporation?
Finally, this article addresses the dualism in the internal and external aspects
of the relationship between corporations and democracy by situating the governance and
impact of corporations within the broader democratic governance of society. Specifically,
individuals in charge of corporations lack democratic consent and accountability for their
decisions unless either internal corporate governance is consistent with democratic values;
persons without a voice through internal corporate governance can avoid the impact of
such decisions by not dealing with the corporation; or democratically elected federal, state,
and local governments can intervene when externalities and market failures render refusal
to deal unrealistic. This, in turn, suggests the need to limit excessive political influence
by those in charge of corporations or to reform the anti-democratic aspects of internal
corporate governance.
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Introduction
I confess to being a fan of science fiction portraying dystopian
futures. A common trope in such fiction has powerful corporations
controlling or even constituting the government while shadowy schemers
or rich elites control the corporations.1 As with all such fiction, this vision
of the future reflects present fears. Numerous writings both in academic2
and mainstream3 publications address the perceived danger that powerful
corporations pose to democracy.4
Unfortunately, these writings often remind one of the parable of the
blind men describing an elephant in which each description, while accurate
in its own way, misses the mark in picturing the beast as a whole. Similarly,
writings about corporations and democracy tend to look at pieces of the
topic but, in doing so, can miss the bigger picture.
Some writers, particularly those reacting to the Citizens United
decision,5 focus on the external to the corporation. They address corporate
influence over democratically elected governments and the clash between
1

2

3

4

5

E.g., Incorporated (TV series), Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incorporated_
(TV_series) (last visited Mar. 1, 2022) (“The series takes place in a dystopian Milwaukee
in the year 2074, where many countries have gone bankrupt due to a number of crises
and climate change. In the absence of effective government, powerful multinational
corporations have become de facto governments, controlling areas called Green
Zones.”); Continuum (TV series), Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuum_
(TV_series) (last visited Mar. 1, 2022) (stating that the program begins “in 2077-era
Vancouver under the corporatocratic and oligarchic dystopia of the North American
Union and its Corporate Congress”).
E.g., Corporations and American Democracy (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William
J. Novak eds., 2017); Jens Dammann & Horst Eidenmueller, Codetermination and the
Democratic State, 2022 U. Ill. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022), http://ssrn.com/abstract_
id=3680769; Luigi Zingales, Towards a Political Theory of the Firm, J. Econ. Persps.,
Summer 2017, at 113, 113–14; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Courts’ Role
in Eroding “We the People’s” Ability to Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 423, 432 (2016).
E.g., Sheldon Whitehouse with Melanie Wachtell Stinnett, Captured: The
Corporate Infiltration of American Democracy (2017); Tim Wu, The Curse of
Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age (2018); Lee Drutman, How Corporate
Lobbyists Conquered American Democracy, Atlantic (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.
theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/how-corporate-lobbyists-conqueredamerican-democracy/390822/.
This fear goes back to the founding of the republic. E.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas
Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate
Law History, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 877, 894–96 (2016) (quoting early American
sources, including Thomas Jefferson, expressing concern regarding the “aristocracy of
our monied corporations which dare already to challenge our government”).
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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government efforts to control corporations and the assertion by corporations
of free speech rights normally associated with individuals.6 As far as the
internal governance of the corporation, it may as well be a black box in
which an artificial intelligence (A.I.) commands decisions designed to
increase corporate profits at the public’s expense.7
Other writers focus on the internal governance of the corporation.
Starting with the fact that the individuals legally in charge of corporations—
the members of the board of directors—are normally elected in an ostensibly
democratic process,8 these writers address to what extent such “corporate”
or “shareholder democracy” is consistent with democratic norms, and, if
not, what, if anything, should be done about it.9 Typically unaddressed is
the impact of this issue on the broader question of whether corporations
promote or threaten democratic governance of society more generally.
Some writers address facets of the interplay between the external
impact of corporations on democracy and internal corporate governance.10
6

7

8
9

10

E.g., Corporations and American Democracy, supra note 2; Strine, supra note 2;
Zingales, supra note 2; Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Person, State, or Not: The Place of Business
Corporations in Our Constitutional Order, 87 U. Colo. L. Rev. 351, 361–62 (2016); Justin
Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 217, 223
(2010); Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign Speech After Citizens
United, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 2365 (2010).
A number of writers implicitly attempt to justify this approach by invoking the so-called
“shareholder primacy” norm. The argument is that we can look past the actual wishes
of the human beings making decisions for corporations because the law commands
them to focus on profits for the shareholders and nothing else. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr.
& Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate
Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 335, 347–48 (2015) (explaining
the shareholder primacy norm and its impact on the use of corporate power after
Citizens United). Except in the most extreme case, however, the law in practice does
not constrain directors in their discretion to balance shareholder profits versus other
impacts of corporate activities. E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Getting Real About Corporate
Social Responsibility: A Reply to Professor Greenfield, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 645, 651–52
(2002).
E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Corporation Law 181 (3d ed. 2021).
E.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Corporation Reborn: From Shareholder
Primacy to Shared Governance, 61 B.C. L. Rev. 2419, 2430 (2020); Sung Eun (Summer)
Kim, De-Democratization of Firms: A Case Study of Publicly-Listed Private Equity Firms, 9
Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 323, 329 (2019); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder
Franchise, 93 Va. L. Rev. 675 (2007); Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of
Shareholder and Civic Democracy, 63 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1389 (2006).
E.g., Dammann & Eidenmueller, supra note 2 (manuscript at 5, 39) (advocating worker
election of some corporate directors to limit through “checks and balances” the threat
corporations pose to democracy); Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law,
69 Vand. L. Rev. 639, 665 (2016) (discussing the challenges for internal corporate
governance in deciding whether corporations should assert First Amendment
rights); David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social
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Yet, even these writers can miss the total picture.
In fact, the interaction of the external and internal relationship
between corporations and democracy is one of a series of dualisms
in the degree to which the governance of corporations, as well as the
impact of corporations on the governance of society, advance or threaten
democratic values. Among the dualisms are pro- and anti-democratic
impacts of corporations, conflicts between utilitarian economic goals and
pursuing democratic values, and the ever-present prospect for unintended
consequences.
These dualisms began with the earliest business corporations, which
engaged in tyrannical governance on the Indian subcontinent on the one
hand,11 but planted the seeds for democratic government in the United States
on the other.12 They extend through a paradoxical corporate law evolution
in which efforts to democratize the use of corporations by making them easy
to establish had the impact of turning corporations into the dominant and
oft-feared form for conducting large businesses.13 At the same time, the fear
of highly successful and hence powerful corporations has collided with the
desire both for the economic growth such corporations bring, as well as to
avoid the economic dislocations caused by failed corporations.14
Further dualism exists between pro- and anti-democratic aspects
of corporate or shareholder democracy. On the pro side, the enforcement
of corporate law by judges outside of the body politic of any individual
corporation allows corporate law to contain rules that mitigate some of the
greatest current threats to democratic elections generally.15 Yet, shareholder
democracy operates under a fundamentally anti-democratic pay-to-play
system.16 This, in turn, reflects a dualism as to the purpose for shareholder
voting: Does it exist to establish democratic legitimacy for those controlling
the often-vast wealth and power of the corporation, or is it simply a tool to
incentivize economically efficient business decisions even at the expense of
democratic values?17
This leads to the overriding dualism created by the interactions

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1197, 1197 (2011) (advocating
stakeholder representation on corporate boards—albeit not necessarily elected by
the stakeholders—in order to protect the interests of corporate stakeholders who
governments fail to protect because of corporate lobbying).
See infra text accompanying notes 28–33.
See infra text accompanying notes 41–50.
See infra text accompanying notes 54–66.
See infra text accompanying notes 76–82.
See infra text accompanying notes 93–124.
See infra text accompanying notes 152–63.
See infra text accompanying notes 164–98.
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between the internal and the external regarding the governance and impact
of corporations. A corporation—or more precisely a business corporation—
is one of a number of types of institutions or associations that compose
any society and impact the lives of individuals in the society. If the essence
of democracy is the consent of,18 or accountability to,19 the governed,
one must ask what provides that consent or accountability for those in
charge of corporations—or, indeed, those in charge of other institutions
and associations. To seek an answer, one must look not just at the internal
governance of corporations or at the external constraints placed upon
corporations, but at the interactions between both.
Consent or accountability does not exist unless those impacted by
the decisions of the individuals in charge of corporations either have a voice
through participation in the democratic election of those in charge, can
realistically refuse to associate with the corporation and its activities—thereby
denying consent or enforcing accountability through exit20—or can count
on the prospect for democratically elected governments intervening when
market failure or externalities render non-association into an inadequate
protection. This means that excessive political influence by those in charge
of corporations—the broad policy issue overhanging Citizens United—can
upset this balance for achieving democratic accountability. This, in turn,
suggests that democratic values may call for limiting the political influence
of those in charge of corporations or rethinking the basic structure of
corporate governance.
The tour through the dualisms which lead to this conclusion will
proceed as follows: Part I of this article looks at the historical dualisms in
the relationship between corporations and democracy. Part II then focuses
on the internal by examining the dualisms underlying so-called corporate
or shareholder democracy. Part III expands the discussion to explore the
interactions between the internal governance of the corporation and the
impact of corporations on the broader democratic governance of society
and outlines the implications of this analysis.

18
19
20

E.g., The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776); Virginia Declaration of Rights
§§ 2–3 (1776).
E.g., José María Maravall, Accountability and Manipulation, in Democracy, Accountability,
and Representation 154, 186 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds.1999).
See, e.g., Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in
Firms, Organizations, and States 4 (1970).
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I. The Dualisms of Corporations and Democracy in History
From the beginning, the interactions between corporations and
democratic governance exhibited the dualisms underlying this topic.

A. Territorial Governance by Early Corporations
While the science fiction visions of government by or under the
control of powerful corporations, either in some far-off quadrant of space
or in a dystopian future Earth, might seem farfetched,21 it matches the
early history of the corporation. This history captures both the prospect
for corporations to serve as a source of despotic rule or as a source for
instituting democratic government. The former involves the English East
India Company, while the later involves the companies set up to establish
colonies in what would become the United States.

1. The Anti-Democratic History of the East India Company
The East India Company received its charter from England’s first
Queen Elizabeth at the start of the seventeenth century.22 This company, along
with its Dutch competitor, played an important role in the development of
what became known as a joint stock company—what we now call a business
corporation in which numerous investors purchase transferable shares of
ownership in a firm conducting a large-scale business thereby becoming
shareholders or stockholders.23 This model for conducting business has
contributed considerably to economic growth.24 In terms of political history,
however, the East India Company’s impact was far more negative.
From its outset, the East India Company reflected a hazy line
between private enterprise and public function. While illustrative that the
early corporate charters were granted in order to carry out some public
function beyond simply profits for shareholders,25 the public function of
21

22
23
24
25

But see Taylor Locke, Elon Musk on Planning for Mars: ‘The City Has to Survive if the Resupply
Ships Stop Coming from Earth,’ CNBC (Mar. 9, 2020) (updated Jan. 12, 2021), https://
www.cnbc.com/2020/03/09/spacex-plans-how-elon-musk-see-life-on-mars.html
(discussing Elon Musk’s proposal for a colony on Mars undertaken by his Space X
corporation).
E.g., George Cawston & A.H. Keane, The Early Chartered Companies (A.D. 12961858) 87–90, 99 (London & New York, Edward Arnold 1896).
E.g., Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci et al., The Emergence of the Corporate Form, 33 J.L. Econ. &
Org. 193, 195–99 (2017).
Id.
See, e.g., Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5
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the East India Company was not that noble. Among the powers listed in
its charter was “to wage war” and the company’s trading fleet included
warships.26 While the movies might suggest a focus on pirates, the wars
initially waged were against traders from other European powers—who
were using these ventures to engage in wars by proxy.27
In the eighteenth century, the East India Company raised an army
and engaged in wars of conquest against the Mughal empire in India.28
Military success allowed the company to pillage the Bengal treasury—
from whence the Hindustani term for pillage, “loot,” entered the English
language.29 The company also forced an agreement on the local ruler
for the company to supplant the Bengali government’s role in collecting
taxes—which the company’s agents often accomplished through the use of
torture.30 Heavy taxation and the company’s prohibition on local traders
maintaining rice reserves to deal with crop failure combined with a drought
a few years later to trigger a famine in which one out of three Bengalis—
more than 10 million people—died of starvation.31 Despite such costs on the
local population, by early in the nineteenth century, the company controlled
the Indian subcontinent with a private force twice the size of the British
army.32 It would not be until the second half of the nineteenth century, after
the company brutally put down a revolt by its own private army—hanging
tens of thousands of suspected rebels in the process—that the English
government decided to replace the Company’s rule of India.33
The company’s human rights violations were not limited to India.
When China tried to prevent sales by the company of opium produced in
Bengal, the result was the Opium Wars—China’s defeat in which prevented
China from seeking to protect its population against addiction.34
The anti-democratic impact of the East India Company extended
to England itself. Showing that wealthy corporations can gain influence

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

J. Econ. Hist. 1, 22 (1945) (explaining that early corporations were created to carry out
some social function of the state).
E.g., William Dalrymple, The East India Company: The Original Corporate Raiders, Guardian
(Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/04/east-indiacompany-original-corporate-raiders.
E.g., East India - Company, Theodora, https://theodora.com/encyclopedia/e/east_
india_company.html (Sept. 29, 2018).
E.g., Dalrymple, supra note 26.
Id.
Id.
E.g., Zingales, supra note 2, at 116.
E.g., Dalrymple, supra note 26.
Id.
See Soutik Biswas, How Britain’s Opium Trade Impoverished Indians, BBC (Sept. 5, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49404024.
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without engaging in expensive modern political campaigns featuring TV
advertisements, the East India Company held considerable sway over the
English Parliament—one quarter of whose members at various points
owned stock in the company.35 This proved handy when, a few years after its
stock price soared by virtue of the pillage of the Bengal treasury, a dramatic
shortfall in company revenues from Bengal resulted from ruinous taxation
and famine in the province. This threatened the ability of the company to
pay its debts, and, in turn, led to the collapse of banks across Europe. A
government bailout followed.36

2. The Democratic Legacy of the American Colonial Companies
Before dismissing corporations as having had an entirely negative
impact on democratic governance, it is worthwhile to look at American
history and ask where some of our democratic traditions originated. In fact,
more than half of the thirteen colonies that became the original United
States began as corporations.37 While the operations of these corporations
often included egregious violations of human rights,38 these corporations
also laid a foundation for democratic government in the United States.
One component of democratic governance in the United States
is the existence of a written constitution.39 Scholars recognize that the
experience with written corporate charters, which outlined the governance
structure for companies establishing colonies in North America, played a
central role in the American penchant for written constitutions.40
More broadly, the corporations that created the American colonies
played a significant role in the establishment of representative democracy
in this country. The familiar version of U.S. history points to the Virginia
House of Burgesses called in 1619 as the first example of representative
government among the colonists in what would become the United States.41
35
36
37
38
39

40
41

E.g., Dalrymple, supra note 26.
Id.
E.g., Nikolas Bowie, Why the Constitution Was Written Down, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1397, 1407
(2019).
Enslavement and the theft of land from the indigenous population.
Of course, England’s development into a democracy based upon norms and traditions
forming an unwritten constitution, coupled with the existence of numerous autocratic
regimes established under written constitutions, raise the question as to how much a
written constitution really contributes to democracy.
Bowie, supra note 37, at 1407; William C. Morey, The Genesis of a Written Constitution, 1
Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 529, 535 (1891).
E.g., Joshua J. Mark, House of Burgesses, World Hist. Encyclopedia (Feb. 24, 2021),
https://www.worldhistory.org/House_of_Burgesses/.
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This development, however, occurred within the context of the governance
of the corporations establishing the Virginia and other colonies in North
America.
Early in the 1600s, James I granted charters for two companies to
establish colonies in what would become the United States: in the south,
what was known as the London or Virginia Company, and in the north,
the Plymouth Company.42 The original charter of the London Company
departed from the normal governance model for chartered companies insofar
as James attempted to preserve power for himself to appoint the governing
councils for the company—one in London and a local one in Virginia.
This was soon supplanted by a charter establishing the more customary
corporate governance model of periodic assemblies by the members of the
company—those who we would now refer to as shareholders—who elected
a governor and a board of assistants (what we would now refer to as a board
of directors).43
This more democratic governance, however, occurred only
in England, leaving the actual colony in Virginia under the control of a
governor appointed by the shareholders in England rather than the
colonists in Virginia. Tensions set off by this scheme resulted in the company
establishing the House of Burgesses consisting of representatives sent from
the plantations and towns in Virginia. The company codified this into a
permanent arrangement in an ordinance the company adopted in 1621.44
Views vary as to whether the company based this representative scheme on
the English Parliament or on its own governing structure with its elected
board.45 In either event, representative democracy in the United States gets
it start in decisions by a corporation.
The corporate origins of American democracy took a somewhat
different route in the north. As a result of various machinations, the Plymouth
Company granted to a group forming the Massachusetts Bay Company some
of the Plymouth Company’s land.46 The charter forming the Massachusetts
Bay Company incorporated the same essential governance structure as the
London Company and other chartered companies—periodic assemblies
of the members to elect a board of assistants (directors) and a governor.47
42

43
44
45
46
47

E.g., 2 John P. Davis, Corporations: A Study of the Origin and Development
of Great Business Combinations and of Their Relation to Authority of the
State 158–59 (1905). London and Plymouth referred to where the organizers of the
companies were from.
E.g., id.; Morey, supra note 40, at 538–41.
E.g., Morey, supra note 40, at 541–42.
Id. at 543.
E.g., Bowie, supra note 37, at 1413–14.
E.g., Morey, supra note 40, at 549.
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There was one critical difference: The charter did not require the assemblies
of the membership and the elected assistants to be in England. Accordingly,
the members of the Massachusetts Bay Company—who were using the
company structure to further a religious and political agenda and accordingly
consisted of members in the Puritan church—met in Massachusetts.48 As
a result, the elected governing board of the Massachusetts Bay Company
became, in effect, the Massachusetts colonial legislature.
The corporate charter for the Massachusetts Bay Company
remained the governing constitution for the Massachusetts colony until
1691, when a new royal charter for the colony replaced the Massachusetts
Bay Company’s corporate charter. The 1691 charter, however, preserved
the existing governance structure, except that the king thereafter appointed
the colony’s governor.49 While James dissolved the London Company in
1624, the governance structure in Virginia established by the company’s
1621 ordinance remained and later served as a model for other colonies
in Maryland and the Carolinas. The governance structure established by
the Massachusetts Bay Company’s 1628 charter provided a model for other
colonies in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire.50

3. Finding the Difference in the Internal versus the External
While it might be tempting to see the difference between the East
India Company versus the London and Massachusetts Bay Companies as
simply showing that the managers of some companies are evil and others
are more well behaved, there is a more useful way to look at this. All of these
companies followed an elected governance structure providing democratic
accountability to their members. The difference arose in democratic
accountability to those who had not invested in the companies.
While the East India Company’s management was accountable
to the shareholders in England through the shareholders’ right to elect the
company’s governing board,51 there was no such accountability to those
governed by the company in India or impacted by the company’s activities
in China. By contrast, a key moment for democracy in what would become
the United States was the London and Massachusetts Bay Companies’
export of their own elected governance structure for use by the colonists in
48
49
50
51

E.g., Bowie, supra note 37, at 1418–20.
E.g., Morey, supra note 40, at 550.
Id. at 544, 550, 552.
See, e.g., Cawston & Keane, supra note 22, at 87 (describing governance provisions in
the East India Company charter).
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North America.52 No doubt, the identity of the colonists in North America
as English was critical to this different treatment.53 All told, the examples of
territorial governance by early corporations illustrate the dualism inherent
in the internal and external aspects of the relationship between corporations
and democracy.

B. A Pair of Incorporation Paradoxes
1. The Easy Formation Paradox
The evolution of corporate law illustrates further dualism regarding
the relationships between corporations and democracy. To begin with, one
might ask why, if corporations pose such a potential threat to democracy,
they are so easy to form. In fact, this is the result of a legal evolution designed
to promote democratic values.
The earlier discussion of the East India Company and of the
companies forming colonies in America referred to charters granted by
Elizabeth I and James I, which established these corporations. This is
because, for most of their history, corporations came into existence through
a one-off act of the sovereign (decree by the monarch or bill enacted by
the legislature) which granted a charter to establish each specific proposed
corporation.54 The charter would indicate generally what the corporation
was to do, the powers it would have, and how it was to be governed.55
The discretionary authority to establish, or not, every corporation
under this system gives the government (whether represented by the
monarch or legislature) significant potential power to control corporations.
The government can refuse to create the corporation unless convinced there
is some good for the economy and society to come from doing so—indeed,
business corporations were relatively scarce in England, let alone America,
52

53

54
55

It should be mentioned that these representative institutions reflected the cramped
view of democracy of their time: The Virginia House of Burgesses was elected by
property owning white men, and membership in the Massachusetts Bay Company was
only for members of the Puritan church.
Charters of the Massachusetts Bay and other colonial companies commonly contained
clauses granting British people living under the corporation’s jurisdiction “all liberties
and immunities of free and natural subjects” to reassure potential emigrants that living
overseas would not make their families’ legal status any worse than if they stayed at
home. See, e.g., Bowie, supra note 37, at 1417–18.
E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Corporate Law: The End of History or a NeverEnding Story?, 86 Wash. L. Rev. 475, 483 (2011).
James Willard Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of
the United States 1780-1970, at 15–16 (1970).

Vol. 14, Iss. 2

Northeastern University Law Review

381

under this system.56 The refusal to grant charters to prospective competitors,
especially when coupled with charters that gave exclusive privileges
(monopolies), meant the government could control the economy by picking
winners and losers (Elizabethan socialism). Unfortunately, the potential for
corruption and entrenching the privileged of society (crony capitalism) is rife
under such a system.57
Since the individual chartering system bespoke of royal prerogatives
and tended to favor those with influence (the aristocracy), it is not surprising
that the French revolutionary government seems to have pioneered the
adoption of a law allowing anyone to form a corporation by complying
with statutory formalities—in other words, replacing special chartering with
what has come to be known as a general incorporation statute.58 Because the
French experiment was short-lived and forgotten, New York likes to claim
credit for pioneering general incorporation with its 1811 statute, which
allowed the formation of manufacturing corporations by compliance with
statutory formalities rather than obtaining special legislation.59
The New York effort took hold and in the ensuing decades, state
after state in the United States,60 as well as other nations,61 adopted general
incorporation statutes. In substantial part, the motive in the United States
remained similar to the French revolutionary law. Even if dealing with elected
state legislatures rather than a monarchy, the special chartering system was
perceived as anti-democratic by favoring the well-connected instead of being
equally available to all.62 Still, the early general incorporation laws in the
United States were often highly restrictive and thus many individuals desiring
to establish corporations went to state legislatures for special charters.63
Gradually during the course of the 1800s, the combined effect of liberalized
56
57

58
59
60
61
62
63

E.g., Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev.
785, 792–94 (2013).
E.g., Eric Hilt, Early American Corporations and the State, in Corporations and American
Democracy, supra note 2, at 37, 71 (“Legislative authority over access to corporate
charters was one of the principal mechanisms by which wealthy and politically
connected elites protected their interests.”).
E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 54, at 483.
See, e.g., Hilt, supra note 57, at 54 (explaining that general incorporation for business
corporations started with manufacturing, because this was less controversial than
general incorporation in more politically sensitive fields such as banking).
E.g., Steven A. Bank & Ajay K. Mehrotra, Corporate Taxation and the Regulation of Early
Twentieth-Century American Business, in Corporations and American Democracy, supra
note 2, at 177, 188–98.
E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 54, at 484–85.
E.g., Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak, Corporations and American Democracy: An
Introduction, in Corporations and American Democracy, supra note 2, at 1, 2–3.
Id. at 12–13.
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general incorporation statutes and the enactment of state constitutional
provisions curbing the legislatures’ power to grant special charters, ended
the use of specially chartered corporations instead of formation under the
general incorporation statutes in the United States.64
The irony, of course, is that this effort to democratize corporations
by making them an easily available form for conducting business meant that
corporations proliferated.65 This, in turn, allowed corporations to become
the dominant form for conducting larger businesses66 and leads us to the
subject matter of this article: the fear that they pose a threat to democracy.

2. The Success Paradox
The fact that corporations are easy to form does not in itself,
however, account for their popularity—after all, partnerships are even easier
to form.67 Instead, several attributes make corporations an attractive form
particularly for conducting larger businesses.
The first of these attributes—embodied in the very term
“corporation”—is the concept of a legal person able to own property, enter
contracts, and survive the coming and going of individuals benefitting
from and carrying out its activities. This corporate attribute long predates
the business corporation and reflects the need to use property in various
communal activities—be this the common land or gathering hall used by
a town or the cathedral used by a church. Ownership of the property by
the individual inhabitants of the town or officials of the church creates an
obvious problem as the individuals die or otherwise cease involvement with
the community activity. Hence, medieval Europeans, picking up terminology
and concepts from Roman law, sought and received charters from their kings,
creating town, church, and other corporations able to own property.68 The
charters for the early business corporations, such as the East India Company,
picked up this attribute by referring to the company as a body corporate and
empowering the company to own property and the like.69
The earlier discussion of the East India Company already mentioned
its pioneering role in establishing what is referred to as a joint stock company.
64
65
66
67
68
69

Gevurtz, supra note 8, at 26.
See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation 2–3 (2010) (pointing to
data showing that far more corporations than other forms of businesses, excluding sole
proprietorships, have filed income tax returns in the United States).
E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 8, at 1.
See, e.g., Holmes v. Lerner, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130, 138–39 (1999) (partnership formed
without the parties apparently realizing that they had done so).
E.g., Blair, supra note 56, at 788–90.
See, e.g., Cawston & Keane, supra note 22, at 87.
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Indeed, much of the world refers to what we in the United States call a
corporation as a “stock company” or some variant thereof.70 This reflects
a second attribute of the business corporation—ownership through freely
transferable fungible shares of stock.
The English East India Company was part of a metamorphosis
from so-called regulated companies—essentially guilds whose membership
consisted of merchants conducting independent operations under the
company’s exclusive government-granted franchise—into joint stock
companies in which voting power and economic return came from investing
in the capital funding the company’s business (the joint stock) in exchange
for fungible shares in the joint stock (thereby making one a shareholder or
stockholder).71 The Dutch (or United) East India Company—chartered
a couple of years after the English company—took this arrangement a
critical step further by making the shares fully transferable to any buyer.72
The liquidity this provided meant that investors in the Dutch company did
not have to wait literally for their “ships to come in” to obtain any money.
The buying and selling of freely tradeable stock first by the Dutch and then
others led to the organization of stock markets.73
The third attribute making the corporate form of business attractive
is limited liability for the shareholders—meaning the shareholders are
not personally liable for the company’s debts. While modern discussions
of business form often treat this as the most important advantage for the
corporation over other business forms,74 limited liability is the most recent
attribute to arrive on the scene—for example, not being part of California’s
corporate law until 1931.75
While these attributes make the corporate form attractive, especially
for operating large, capital-intensive businesses, they create another paradox
from the standpoint of corporations and democracy. The ability of
corporations to hold property as the company’s owners come and go, and to
raise capital from large numbers of investors who retain liquidity by being
able to resell their shares in stock markets and who are not deterred from
70
71
72
73
74
75

Franklin A. Gevurtz, Global Issues in Corporate Law 4 (2006)
E.g., 1 William Robert Scott, The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish
and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720, at 155–58 (1912); M. Schmitthoff, The
Origin of the Joint-Stock Company, 3 U. Toronto L.J. 74 (1939).
E.g., Dari-Mattiacci et al., supra note 23, at 196.
E.g., Lodewijk Petram, The World’s First Stock Exchange (Lynne Richards trans.,
2014).
E.g., James D. Cox & Thomas L. Hazen, Business Organizations Law 7 (4th ed. 2016)
(“A primary advantage is the shareholders’ limited liability.”).
E.g., Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. Corp. L. 573, 597–98
(1986).
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investing by fear of personal liability, all combine to make the corporation
a highly efficient vehicle for conducting large scale economic activities
contributing to economic growth.76 Success in these activities increases the
wealth held by the corporation. This success and accumulation of corporate
wealth, however, creates potential political influence and the fear that
wealthy and powerful corporations can become a threat to democracy.77
Early corporate statutes in the United States reflected this fear by
imposing limits designed to curb corporate wealth and power. Early general
incorporation statutes often set a maximum capital that the corporation could
raise.78 In addition, nineteenth century court opinions held it was beyond the
power of a corporation to own stock in other corporations,79 thereby limiting
the growth of the powerful corporate groups operating in diverse fields that
we see today. This changed after the Civil War. State corporate law limits on
corporate power collapsed as a result of competition between states seeking
revenue from in-state incorporation.80 Moreover, many opinion makers were
inclined to see economic concentration as both inevitable and desirable—a
source of economic prosperity, rather than something to be feared.81
The history of corporations and corporate law also showed that
corporate failure provided as much ground for fear as did corporate success.
Specifically, limited liability means leaving creditors of failed corporations
unpaid.82 More importantly, the Dutch invention of transferable stock and
stock markets has led to a never-ending boom and bust cycle with economic
downturns following stock market crashes83—as most dramatically illustrated
by the Great Depression following the 1929 crash. All told, we end up with
a “Goldilocks problem”: We seem to want corporations to be successful, but
not too successful.

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

E.g., John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, The Company: A Short History
of a Revolutionary Idea, at xv (2005); Ralph Gomory & Richard Sylla, The American
Corporation, Daedalus, Spring 2013, at 102, 102.
See Zingales, supra note 2, at 113.
E.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 550–54 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
E.g., Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in
American Business 323 (1977).
Liggett, 288 U.S. at 557–60 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
E.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W.
Va. L. Rev. 173, 190–97 (1985).
It is debatable, however, whether there would be less negative economic consequences
to the economy if the shareholders had to pay these debts.
E.g., Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities
Regulation, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 393, 403–17 (2006).
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II. The Dualisms of Corporate or Shareholder Democracy
Another common attribute of corporations is governance under
the ultimate authority of a board of directors elected by the shareholders.84
While the presence of numerous shareholders with freely tradable stock
creates the need for central management—in other words, it makes direct
management by all of the shareholders impractical—the notion that this
central management should take the more democratic form of representatives
elected by the shareholders, rather than following a more autocratic structure,
is not inherent. Indeed, there are businesses in which persons invest in which
they do not elect the managers.85 While it is common to refer to the elected
corporate governance structure as corporate or shareholder democracy,86
the degree to which either the actualities of this structure or the rationales
behind it reflect democratic values exhibits the dualism running throughout
the relationship between corporations and democracy.

A. Corporate or Shareholder Democracy as a Shining City on a Hill
Events in recent years have suggested that the potential threat
to democracy posed by corporate influence may pale in comparison to a
couple of other threats: (1) efforts to game districting and election mechanics
for political advantage (gerrymandering and voter suppression); and (2)
the proliferation of ever more brazen false or misleading statements from
political leaders and their allies. Corporate law contains rules attacking these
sorts of threats when they involve corporate elections. Such rules, however,
are probably infeasible for non-corporate elections. Hence, corporate or
shareholder democracy starts off with a significant advantage.

84
85

86

See supra note 8.
As is commonly the case with a limited partnership. See, e.g., Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act,
Prefatory Note (Unif. L. Comm’n 2013) (purpose of the new Uniform Limited
Partnership Act is to provide a form of business for people who want strong central
management, strongly entrenched, and passive investors with little control).
E.g., Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the History
of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1347, 1363 (2006) (referring to
“shareholder democracy”); David L. Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations:
Critical Reflections on the Rule of “One Share, One Vote,” 56 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 55 (1970)
(referring to “corporate democracy”).
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1. Judicial Intervention against Gaming Corporate Elections
While gerrymandering or otherwise gaming the mechanics of noncorporate elections is as old as the republic,87 recent events have focused
renewed attention on the dangers such practices pose to democracy.88
Legal limits in the United States on such conduct are often indirect.
For many years, the most promising line of attack commonly has been to
characterize the districting or other conduct as racial discrimination violating
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.89 The problem with this approach occurs
when the racial discriminatory aspect of the action is incidental to a partisan
purpose. In other words, the Jim Crow laws sought to disenfranchise Black
people because they were Black, regardless of how they would vote.90 By
contrast, efforts to suppress the vote of those likely to support an opposition
political party only establish an issue of racial discrimination insofar as
partisan affiliations correlate with racial identity. But this raises the question
of whether motive or effect is to be the test,91 and, if effect is to be the test,92
then how much of an effect is necessary.93
Even beyond claims of racial discrimination, judicial intervention
against gaming non-corporate elections often requires fitting the challenged
conduct into a framework focused on equal rights and the like for individual
voters, which can miss the real issues presented by electoral tactics designed
to frustrate democratic accountability.94
87
88

89
90

91
92
93
94

See Elmer C. Griffith, The Rise and Development of the Gerrymander (1907)
(discussing gerrymanders early in American history).
E.g., Sheldon H. Jacobson, Gerrymandering and Restricting Voting Rights: Flip Sides of the
Same Coin, Hill (July 1, 2021), https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/560995gerrymandering-and-restricting-voting-rights-flip-sides-of-the-same-coin;
David
Daley, Inside the Republican Plot for Permanent Minority Rule, New Republic (Oct. 15,
2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/159755/republican-voter-suppression-2020election.
52 U.S.C. § 10301. Whether this will change after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021), remains to be seen.
E.g., Brian K. Landsberg, Free at Last to Vote: The Alabama Origins of the 1965
Voting Rights Act 12, 23 (2007); Malia Brink, Fines, Fees, and the Right to Vote, A.B.A.
(Feb. 9, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_
rights_magazine_home/voting-rights/fines--fees--and-the-right-to-vote/ (“In 1890,
Mississippi held a state constitutional convention. The president of the convention
declared its purpose plainly: ‘We came here to exclude the N***o.’”).
E.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1980) (holding that the Voting
Rights Act was not violated by discriminatory effect without discriminatory motive).
§ 10301(b) (as amended) (overturning Bolden).
See, e.g., Brnovich, 141 U.S. 2321 (substantially constricting the degree to which racially
discriminatory impact establishes a violation of the Voting Rights Act).
E.g., Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the
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By contrast, Delaware courts have developed a much more direct
doctrine allowing judicial intervention to prevent incumbents from gaming
the system to gain advantages in corporate elections. This began with the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Schnell v. Chris–Craft Industries, Inc.95
Schnell arose out of a contested election for positions on Chris-Craft
Industries’ board of directors.96 The incumbent directors learned that a
dissident group of shareholders intended to solicit their fellow shareholders
to grant proxies—elections of directors for publicly held corporations
normally taking place through voting by proxies97—for an alternate slate
to replace the incumbents at the next annual shareholders meeting.98 The
incumbents responded by amending Chris-Craft’s bylaws to advance the
date of the annual meeting by approximately a month.99 At the same time,
the board stalled giving the dissident group access to the corporation’s list of
shareholders (making it difficult to know whom to solicit for proxies).100 The
combined impact was to dramatically undercut the challengers’ chances of
unseating the incumbents at the annual meeting.
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the change in meeting date
should be enjoined.101 In doing so, the court explained that even though
the corporation’s bylaws and Delaware’s corporation statute authorized
the directors to change the meeting date, courts have the power to prevent
incumbents from using such authority to gain an inequitable advantage in an
election.102 Schnell thus created a foundation for judicial intervention against
inequitable actions by incumbents to game corporate election contests.
Condemning actions in corporate election contests because they are
“inequitable” does not exactly give much guidance for determining what is
condemned. It was the Delaware Chancery (trial) Court’s decision in Blasius
Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp. that provided a standard, thus gaining for the lower
court naming rights over the resulting doctrine.103 Specifically, the court in
Blasius adopted a rule requiring the directors to meet a heavy burden of
demonstrating a compelling justification for any action taken to interfere
with the shareholders’ ability to select the directors.104 The court held that
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 503 (2004).
285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
Id. at 439.
See infra text accompanying note 126.
Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439.
Id.
Id. at 438.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 439–40.
564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
The board amended the corporation’s bylaws to increase the board’s size to the
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even the good faith fear of harmful consequences for the corporation from
the action proposed by a shareholder seeking to have its nominees become a
majority of the board105 was not such a justification. While Blasius was only
a decision by the Delaware Chancery Court, the Delaware Supreme Court
subsequently followed Blasius’ compelling justification test.106

2. The Ban on False or Misleading Communication in Corporate
Elections
In campaigns involving federal, state, and local elections, charges
and countercharges between candidates, and for and against various ballot
propositions, which, if not outright false, are at least misleading, have long
seemed to be the norm. The remedy for those in the arena is to respond with
denials and perhaps by hurling more scurrilous charges at one’s opponent
in retaliation. A hope has been that news media could set some boundaries
by exposing the worst lies.107 Unfortunately, studies report mixed results
on media fact checking,108 and opinion polls often seemingly support the
sad insight of Goebbels and Orwell that, for many, the big lie, frequently
repeated in simple language, can trump the facts.109
By contrast, corporate law has long prohibited directors and
others from making false or misleading statements in soliciting votes from
shareholders. This prohibition exists in both state110 and federal law. The
federal prohibition stems from Section 14(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange
maximum number allowed by the company’s certificate of incorporation and filled
the vacancies. This “board packing” scheme preempted the ability of a dissident
shareholder to have the shareholders expand the board and fill the vacancies with the
dissident’s nominees. Id.
105 The plaintiff shareholder proposed a large distribution of money from the corporation
to its shareholders. Id.
106 MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1128 (Del. 2003).
107 See, e.g., Darrell M. West, How to Combat Fake News and Disinformation, Brookings (Dec.
18, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-anddisinformation/ (“It is important for news organizations to call out fake news and
disinformation without legitimizing them.”).
108 E.g., Alexander Agadjanian et al., Counting the Pinocchios: The Effect of Summary FactChecking Data on Perceived Accuracy and Favorability of Politicians, Rsch. & Pol., July–Sept.
2019, at 1, https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.dartmouth.edu/dist/5/2293/
files/2021/03/summary-fact-checking.pdf.
109 E.g., Chris Cillizza, 1 in 3 Americans Believe the ‘Big Lie,’ CNN , https://www.cnn.
com/2021/06/21/politics/biden-voter-fraud-big-lie-monmouth-poll/index.html
(June 21, 2021) (discussing opinion polls showing that 32% of those polled believe
unfounded claims by Trump and his allies that Biden’s victory in the 2020 presidential
election was the result of massive fraud).
110 E.g., Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977).
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Act.111

The Securities Exchange Act is part of the New Deal legislation and
reflects the traditional view that the 1929 stock market crash triggered the
Great Depression. Hence, the Act contains a variety of provisions designed
to increase confidence in the stock market and prevent abuses which
Congress believed led to the crash.112 Section 14(a), however, has a bit of a
different focus. It responds to the concern that the practical powerlessness
of shareholders in the governance of publicly held corporations, in part
because of problems with proxy voting, contributed to poor performance
by large corporations and, therefore, the country’s economic problems.113
Accordingly, the Section empowers the Securities and Exchange Commission
to adopt regulations governing the solicitation of proxies to vote shares in
publicly traded corporations.
Among the regulations promulgated by the SEC pursuant to Section
14(a) is Rule 14a–9.114 Rule 14a-9 prohibits proxy solicitations which contain
any false statements as to material facts—in other words, facts a reasonable
shareholder would find important in deciding how to vote.115 It also prohibits
proxy solicitations which omit material facts when the omission makes the
statements in the solicitation misleading or no longer correct. Solicitations
potentially include any communication intended to lead shareholders to
grant or withhold a proxy.116 Violations of Rule 14a-9 trigger a variety of
enforcement provisions under the Act.117 In addition, the Supreme Court
has held that shareholders have an implied private right of action against
those violating the Rule.118

3. Why these Rules Work in Corporate, but not General, Elections
Tempting as it might be to write an article advocating the import of
these rules from corporate to non-corporate elections, the bottom line is that
this is probably infeasible. For one thing, while Rule 14a-9 presumably falls
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

15 U.S.C. § 78n(a).
See, e.g., id. at § 78b (statement of necessity for federal regulation of securities markets).
See, e.g., Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property (1932) (a highly influential work setting out this thesis not long before
the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act).
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2022).
E.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
E.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793, 795–96 (2d Cir. 1985).
E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C § 78u(d) (empowering the SEC
to bring civil actions to enjoin violation of the Act); id. § 78ff (criminal liability for those
who willfully violate the Act).
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432–33 (1964).
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within the doctrine that the First Amendment does not protect untruthful
commercial speech,119 importing a ban on false or misleading speech into the
context of non-corporate elections is probably unconstitutional because of
the much higher protection accorded to political and public issue speech.120
The fundamental problem with importing these corporate law
rules into the non-corporate election context, however, is not doctrinal, but
practical. Specifically, who will determine whether a statement is false or
misleading, or if a party’s drawing of district lines or otherwise carrying
out election mechanics is inequitable (or interferes with the voters’ ability to
select their government without compelling justification)?
It is not uncommon for judges to have some partisan leaning,
especially given the process of their selection, and, even if they do not,
judges must be wary of the perception that their actions are based upon
such a leaning.121 Hence, judges understandably tend to look for clear-cut,
objective standards when entering into politically charged litigation involving
contested non-corporate elections.122 Vague standards like inequitably
disenfranchise voters, or even interference with the effectiveness of the
vote without compelling justification, are not such standards.123 Even the
determination of whether a campaign statement is false or misleading often
119

120
121

122
123

See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980) (clarifying that to qualify for First Amendment protection, commercial speech
must “concern lawful activity and not be misleading”). Actually, the characterization of
Rule 14a-9 as addressing commercial speech is debatable. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler &
Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Governance Speech and the First Amendment, 43 U. Kan. L. Rev.
163 (1994). The prohibition in the securities laws of false or misleading statements in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities squarely falls within the regulation of
commercial speech, which normally refers to advertising and the like designed to entice
persons into buying goods or services. See Larson v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 123 Cal. Rptr.
3d 40, 58–60 (Ct. App. 2011). It seems more difficult to characterize the solicitation of
proxies for election to a corporate board as commercial speech, unless one argues that
a key attribute of any investment is the personnel who will manage the investment (the
directors in the case of a corporation) and so regulating the selection of directors is still
regulation of commercial transactions rather than pure speech.
E.g., Staci Lieffring, Note, First Amendment and the Right to Lie: Regulating Knowingly False
Campaign Speech After United States v. Alvarez, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1047 (2013).
See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma: Law and Legitimacy
in the Supreme Court, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 2240 (2019) (book review) (discussing the
tension between the Court’s desire to maintain legitimacy in the public’s eyes through
“sociological legitimacy” (results do not consistently favor one ideological or political
side over the other) and “legal legitimacy” (results follow a consistently applied legal
approach)).
E.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2500 (2019) (requiring a “clear,
manageable and politically neutral” test for the Court to interfere in legislative
redistricting).
See, e.g., id. (rejecting “fairness” as a test for judicial review of legislative districting).
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can be clouded by one’s political views.124
This problem is largely absent in corporate law because judges
presumably have less inherent bias in contests among the shareholders
and directors of a particular corporation. In other words, to adopt these
corporate law rules for non-corporate elections, we might need to have
judges who were not themselves part of the body politic—perhaps aliens
from another planet or an A.I. Put more seriously, the normal separation
between judges and the corporate body politic creates an inherent advantage
for the enforcement of democratic norms in corporate versus non-corporate
elections.

B. The Anti-Democratic Side of Corporate or Shareholder Democracy
While corporate or shareholder democracy might look good from a
distance, closer examination reveals fundamental flaws.

1. Technical Failings
Discussions of anti-democratic aspects of corporate or shareholder
democracy often focus on narrow electoral mechanics.125 A good example
involves access to the corporation’s solicitation of proxies.
As mentioned earlier, shareholder voting in a publicly held
corporation typically will involve the use of proxies. In other words,
shareholders—few of whom normally would wish to spend the money or
time to travel to a shareholder meeting—will grant authority (a proxy) to
vote their stock to someone who will attend. Commonly, this would be a
representative selected by those in charge of the corporation. Indeed, those
in charge of the corporation typically will have the company solicit the
shareholders to grant such proxies, as otherwise not enough shareholders
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See, e.g., Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Regulating Marijuana Advertising and Marketing to Promote Public
Health: Navigating the Constitutional Minefield, 21 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1081, 1111–12
(2017) (“[T]he Court has continued to recognize that commercial speech is different
[from other speech] in that governments have greater ability to determine the truth or
falsity of commercial speech . . . .”).
E.g., Kim, supra note 9, at 335–41 (looking at who can call shareholder meetings;
what items shareholders vote on; the ability of shareholders to nominate and remove
directors; and the ability of shareholders to bring actions for breach of fiduciary duty);
Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 696–706 (recommending reforms to provide proxy access,
reimbursement of challenger expenses, majority rather than plurality vote to elect
directors; and confidential voting).
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will be present to have a quorum.126
This solicitation, paid for by the corporation, will also typically
request that the shareholders grant authority to vote for a list of nominees
for election to the board. A committee of the current board typically selects
these nominees and thus, not surprisingly, these nominees are mostly the
current incumbents.127 Those wishing to run against the board’s nominees
normally must solicit proxies on their own dime.128 Indeed, the form to grant
a proxy in the solicitation paid for by the corporation looks a lot like the ballot
in old Soviet Union, which listed only the Communist Party’s candidate for
any given office and provided only the “choice” of voting yes (da) or no
(nyet) on the Party’s nominee.129
In recent years, there have been efforts to change this system so
that the names of competing candidates for election to the board appear on
the form for granting a proxy distributed by the corporation and to require
the person exercising the proxy to vote shares for whichever candidates the
shareholders instruct. This is referred to as proxy access.130 At the urging of
institutional and activist shareholders, many public companies have adopted
bylaws providing for proxy access.131 Yet, many of the common limits in
these proxy access bylaws, such as preventing the use of proxy access to run
a slate of candidates for more than a small fraction of the board,132 seem to
have little basis in democratic norms.
Beyond these private efforts, a provision in the Dodd-Frank Act
specifically authorizes the SEC to adopt a proxy access rule.133 Ironically,
in Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Commission,134 the D.C. Circuit
126
127
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134

E.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis
103 (1976).
E.g., id. at 112. While stock exchange rules require the board to have a nominating
committee consisting of so-called independent directors (N.Y.S.E. Rule 303A), there
is no evidence this has led to a substantial change in the practice of renominating
incumbents.
See infra note 136.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (the form for granting a proxy must provide a means for the
shareholder to indicate whether the shareholder is granting or withholding authority to
vote for each director for whom the party soliciting the proxy wishes to vote); Gevurtz,
supra note 8, at 236.
E.g., Holly J. Gregory et al., The Latest on Proxy Access, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp.
Governance (Feb. 1, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/01/thelatest-on-proxy-access/.
Id.
Id.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 971, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
647 F.3d 1144, 1154–56 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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Court of Appeals struck down the rule the SEC came up with based upon
flaws the court found with the SEC’s assessment of the rule’s costs versus
benefits—an anti-democratic bit of judicial activism which effectively
ignored the Congressional mandate.135
Anti-democratic election mechanics, such as limited proxy
access, can be highly significant in undercutting corporate or shareholder
democracy. Indeed, the financial advantage of incumbents in soliciting
proxies at corporate expense, while challengers must (at least unless they
win136) foot the expenses for soliciting their own proxies, explains in part why
corporate elections are rarely contested.137 The lack of contested corporate
elections, in turn, means that, as a practical matter, a self-perpetuating
oligarchy ends up in control over most of the largest corporations.138 Yet,
the anti-democratic mechanics for carrying out corporate elections might be
small potatoes—because it would not require radical change to fix139—next
to the fundamentally anti-democratic nature of shareholder democracy
itself.

135

Curiously, this decision never discusses the fact that the Dodd-Frank Act expressly
authorized the SEC to adopt a proxy access rule. See id. One might have assumed that
this action tells us that Congress concluded the benefits of proxy access as a general
matter outweigh its costs. Hence, unless the SEC’s rule was so beyond the scope of
what Congress envisioned as to call for a reweighing of costs and benefits, that should
have settled the matter.
136 Since courts will not order a corporation to reimburse a shareholder’s proxy solicitation
expenses, Grodetsky v. McCrory Corp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct.), aff ’d, 276 N.Y.S.2d
841 (App. Div. (1966) (mem.)), the challengers must normally win control over the
board to get the directors to vote to pay their expenses. Even then, however, courts
might hold that the corporation cannot reimburse the expenses. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v.
Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1955) (suggesting that the
corporation cannot reimburse expenses unless the contest involved a policy dispute).
137 E.g., Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 682–91 (documenting the infrequency of challenges
to incumbent directors and explaining why proxy expenses contribute to this result).
This can get worse if corporate bylaws attempt to limit proxy solicitation expenditures
challengers are allowed to make even on their own dime. For a discussion and a
proposal to import into corporate law the Buckley doctrine barring caps on political
expenditures, see Andrew A. Schwartz, Financing Corporate Elections, 41 J. Corp. L. 863
(2016).
138 E.g., Zingales, supra note 2, at 114.
139 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 695–706 (setting out proposals to improve corporate
elections).
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2. The Anti-Democratic Pay-to-Play Essence of “Shareholder
Democracy”
In fact, the most anti-democratic feature of corporate or shareholder
democracy is the shareholder part. To see why, it might be helpful to briefly
ask what we mean when we say something is democratic or undemocratic.

a. What is democratic?
Determination of what is democratic or anti-democratic or what
are democratic values and norms can become quite complicated and
contentious. At its most basic, democracy means rule by the people.140
This, however, begs as many questions as it answers. To begin with, in any
sizeable group, having the overall populace make the governing decisions is
largely impractical. Hence, democracy commonly becomes equated with
a republican system in which the overall populace elects those who are in
charge.141
This, in turn, leads to a focus on the laws establishing, and the
implementation of, procedures for elected government. One simple definition
along this line is that a democracy exists if there have been two changes of
the government through free and fair elections and there is no realistic threat
to democracy from an authoritarian government.142 Much seems missing in
such a definition. For instance, are elections free and fair if those in power
control the media and harass efforts by opponents to organize opposition
parties? This leads to lists, such as the often-cited lists put together by Robert
Dahl: universal suffrage; elected representatives; free, fair, and frequent
elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of independent
information; associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship.143
Some social scientists think the focus on elections (the formal
procedures of democracy) is too narrow. Presumably going back to the
elemental notion that democracy is rule by the people, Charles Tilly suggests
defining democracy as “conformity of a state’s behavior to its citizens’
express demands”—which he measures as the degree that relations between
the citizens and the state feature “broad, equal, protected144 and mutually
140
141
142
143
144

E.g., Cary J. Coglianese, Democracy and Its Critics, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1662, 1662 (1990)
(book review).
E.g., The Federalist No. 10, 82 (James Madison) (Dover Thrift ed. 2014).
Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century 267 (1993).
Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy 85–86, 93–99 (1997).
In the sense that citizens can express views without fear of retaliation.
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binding consultation.”145
For present purposes it is unnecessary to choose between these
approaches. Instead, it is sufficient to draw out a pair of core democratic
values common to them.
The first goes to who is entitled to vote in elections (in the narrower
formulation) or participate in the political process as a citizen (in the broader
formulation). Both equate democracy with the breadth of those holding
political rights: Dahl’s list begins with universal suffrage, while Tilly’s first
factor is the breadth of the adults enjoying citizenship rights. Of course,
many nations that are the forebearers of democracy (including the United
States) fell far short of universal suffrage and, indeed, not that long ago
many influential voices would have contested the equation of democracy
with universal suffrage.146 Still, since human institutions are inherently
imperfect, democracy is commonly a matter of more versus less rather than
it is or is not.147 Seen in this light, a wider franchise is more democratic
while a narrower franchise is less democratic.148 Hence, the history of an
expanding right to vote in the United States has been a move from lesser
toward greater democracy.149
Overlapping with the notion of a broadly held ability to participate
as a citizen (vote) is the notion of equality in electoral power among the
citizens (voters). This is Tilly’s second criteria, while Dahl addresses a book
to the topic.150 For those preferring judicial authority, the Supreme Court
recognized this democratic value in its one-person, one-vote decisions: “The
concept of ‘we the people’ under the Constitution visualizes no preferred
class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic qualifications.”151
Actually, the breadth and equality values are two sides of the same core
difference between democracy and other forms of government: Democracy
rejects the notion behind all other forms of government that some individuals
have a greater claim to decision making power than others (except, of course,
insofar as that decision making power traces to democratic election).
145 Charles Tilly, Democracy 13–14 (2007).
146 E.g., id. at 9.
147 E.g., id. at 10; Robert A. Dahl, On Political Equality, at ix (2006).
148 E.g., Tilly, supra note 145, at 14.
149 E.g., id.
150 Dahl, supra note 147.
151 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368
(1963)). But see Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719
(1973) (exception for water district). There are a few explanations for the voter equality
norm ranging from a human worth or dignity rationale to a belief in the “wisdom
of crowds” (i.e., the larger number of individuals are more likely to reach the better
decision).
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b. Why Shareholder “Democracy” Is Not
Looking at these two central democratic values, shareholder
“democracy” misses the mark by a wide margin.152 The principal
features of shareholder democracy are that the franchise is limited to the
shareholders and that voting power is based upon how many shares one
owns rather than one-person, one-vote.153 Both the limited franchise and
the unequal voting power among shareholders, in turn, are symptomatic of
a more fundamental departure of shareholder democracy from democracy.
Essentially, shareholder democracy operates under a vote buying system:
Persons buy into the franchise by purchasing shares and gain greater voting
rights by purchasing more shares.154
We can demonstrate how this is the essence of shareholder voting
by asking why employees do not get a vote. It is not because employees lack
a significant stake in the decisions made by those governing the corporation:
The impact of such decisions on employees is commonly greater than the
impact on the typical public shareholder.155 It is not because employees do
not contribute to the corporation: The corporation would not make money
without them. Instead, it is because employees did not buy stock. In fact, if
employees buy stock, they will get a vote.156
152
153

154

155
156

E.g., Dahl, supra note 143, at 88–90; Pollman, supra note 10, at 675 (“Corporate
governance does not meet [Dahl’s] standards [for democracy]. Not all corporate
participants have voting rights, and those who do have unequal votes.”).
While one-share, one-vote is the norm and default rule, e.g., Grant M. Hayden &
Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30
Cardozo L. Rev. 445, 447 (2008), articles of incorporation often provide for classes
of stock with different voting rights, such as non-voting shares or shares providing
more than one vote per share. Id. at 471. The impact of such multiple class schemes is
typically to further deviate from the democratic value of equality among voters.
See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 Vand. L. Rev.
129, 137 (2009). Admittedly, corporate founders do more than simply buy their stock.
Hence, their control rests on a different, even if still not democratic, basis. A further
deviation of shareholder democracy from democratic values arises from the ability
of various entities—other corporations, investment funds and the like—to own and
vote stock, since this means that individuals are making decisions on how to vote stock
that they do not even own. The undemocratic nature of shareholder voting is glaring
enough without getting into this further deviation from democratic values.
See, e.g., Hayden & Bodie, supra note 9, at 2484–85.
The prospect that employees could get votes in a publicly held corporation by purchasing
stock does not provide a realistic mechanism for democratic accountability. Even if
purchases of single shares (odd lot purchases) are a realistic option, the one-share, onevote, rather than one-person, one-vote, norm trivializes the voting impact of employees
holding a single share. For employees to purchase larger amounts raises problems both
with affordability as well as a dangerous lack of diversification of their investments.
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Corporate finance theory also supports the notion that the
shareholder franchise is essentially a vote buying system. This is a corollary
of the Modigliani and Miller dividend irrelevance theory. This theory
holds that, putting aside potential impact on taxes and the like, corporate
shareholders benefit equally from dividends or from the rise in the price of
their stock as the corporation reinvests its earnings.157 The deeper implication
of this theory is that the economic rights of stock ownership can just as well
constitute simply a theoretical claim to a share of corporate earnings that a
shareholder never needs to actually receive but can benefit from by someone
else purchasing this theoretical claim to earnings, that this person will also
never actually receive except by someone else purchasing this claim and on
and on. In other words, shareholders can simply have pieces of paper (or a
digital equivalent) that says this percentage of a wealth producing enterprise
represents their shares, but they never actually need to see any distribution
of the wealth produced by the enterprise. Under these circumstances, the
only practical right of share ownership becomes the vote.
Yet, the notion that prospective voters should buy their votes
is contrary to fundamental democratic values. As the Supreme Court
recognized in striking down poll taxes, “wealth or fee paying has . . . no
relation to voting qualifications.”158 In fact, shareholder democracy is worse
than a poll tax, since the ability to buy more votes by purchasing more shares
is the equivalent of having a poll tax in which voting power is proportionate
to the amount of tax one is willing and able to pay.  
Indeed, there is a certain irony here insofar as a number of state
corporate laws traditionally have prohibited so-called “vote buying”—in
other words, paying shareholders to vote in an agreed way—in corporate
elections.159 This seemingly mirrors (albeit without the criminal law
consequences) the pretty universal rule in general elections in which it is
illegal to pay voters to vote in a certain way.160
A seeming reconciliation of the vote buying ban in corporate law
with the fact that people always buy votes in corporate elections by buying
stock, invokes concerns about the motivation for buying the right to vote

157
158
159
160

E.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Income Inequality and Corporate Structure, 45 Stetson L. Rev. 69,
85–86 (2015). Ownership through employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) or the like
does not provide the employees themselves (rather than trustees) the vote. Id. at 86–87.
Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares,
34 J. Bus. 411, 429 (1961).
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
E.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 609(e) (McKinney 1998); Macht v. Merchs. Mortg. & Credit
Co., 194 A. 19, 22 (Del. Ch. 1937). But see Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch.
1982) (taking a more nuanced approach to vote buying in corporate elections).
E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 597.
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without buying the stock impacted by how one votes.161 This rationalization
rings rather hollow, however, when one realizes that there are all sorts of
arrangements under which persons can gain the right to vote stock and yet
are insulated from the consequences to the corporation from their votes—
what is sometimes referred to as “empty voting.”162 Moreover, it is not
uncommon for corporations to have more than one class (type) of stock in
which some classes might lack voting rights, or some classes might possess
more than one vote per share—arrangements which are hardly consistent
with the rationale that voting power should be proportionate to economic
consequences.163

C. Dualism in Thinking about Corporate or Shareholder Democracy
The dualism in whether corporate or shareholder democracy
is democratic parallels a dualism in the rationales advanced for having
corporate or shareholder democracy. Specifically, is corporate governance
simply about utilitarian economic outcomes or is a goal to provide democratic
legitimacy for those with the power to govern large corporations?

1. Economics
The departure of shareholder democracy from core democratic
values in large part mirrors a dominant strain in thinking about corporate
governance. This views the topic through an instrumentalist lens concerned
with economic outcomes rather than what is democratic. Interestingly, this is
a common approach both for those rationalizing and promoting shareholder
democracy and for those critical of it.

a. The Economic Efficiency Argument for Shareholder Democracy
Large corporations, like other large organizations, involve joint
activities organized in pyramidal hierarchies. Economists sometimes explain
161
162

163

E.g., Thompson & Edelman, supra note 154, at 162; see also Robert Charles Clark, Vote
Buying and Corporate Law, 29 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 776, 795–97 (1979) (discussing the
concern about selling votes to buyers planning to loot the corporation).
Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable)
Ownership, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 811, 815 (2006) (discussing how the derivatives revolution
in finance, combined with the growth of the share lending market, is making the
decoupling of economic ownership from voting rights ever easier and cheaper).
Indeed, through the ownership of various options or derivatives, it is possible for a
person voting stock to profit from its decline in value.
E.g., Hayden & Bodie, supra note 153, at 480–82.
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this as based upon avoiding the transaction costs that would otherwise exist if
each and every good or service necessary to produce another good or service
came from independent individuals constantly contracting with each other
to supply each and every such good or service.164 The question then becomes
who should stand at the pinnacle of the hierarchy. The economic efficiency
argument is that this should be the person(s) with the best incentives. Those
favoring shareholder democracy on such utilitarian reasoning assert that this
is the shareholders.
This argument views shareholders as the so-called residual claimants
in the corporation—in other words, they get what is left over after everyone
else (employees, suppliers, lenders) gets paid.165 Since the shareholders stand
last in line to obtain assets from the corporation, the first dollar of corporate
loss comes out of their pockets. Since the shareholders get everything made
by the corporation after paying the other claimants, the last dollar of profit
goes into their pockets. Hence, the argument runs, the shareholders’ interest
matches the wealth maximizing or efficient result for the whole venture:
investing until the next possible dollar of gain multiplied by the probability
of obtaining it is less than the next possible dollar of loss multiplied by the
probability of incurring it.166
While, under this view, the shareholders have the best incentives
when making overall corporate decisions and monitoring the supervisors
at the top of the hierarchy carrying out such decisions, in a publicly held
corporation the shareholders are too numerous and rationally disengaged
to do this themselves.167 Therefore, the reasoning continues, shareholders
164

165

166
167

See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 390–91 (1937); Armen
A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 784 (1972). There are variations in the precise explanations for
the existence of firms but exploring this is unnecessary to the present discussion.
Actually, this view of the shareholders being the residual claimants has never been
universally accepted. E.g., Sung Eun (Summer) Kim, A Multi-Criteria Assessment of Corporate
Residual Claimants, SSRN 3 (Mar. 30, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3816061
(discussing the historical and normative arguments for treating various stakeholders in
a business as the residual claimant).
E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & Econ.
395, 406 (1983).
In other words, it is not worthwhile for any one shareholder with a small stake in a
corporation to expend the time necessary to know what is going on in the business since
the overwhelming bulk of the benefit from doing so will go to the other shareholders
who did not bother to spend the time. Moreover, even if a shareholder did so,
attempting to persuade the other shareholders of the merits of what the informed
shareholder proposes would take further expenditures by the informed shareholder, as
well as by the other shareholders to evaluate the information they receive. E.g., Clark,
supra note 161, at 779–83.
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should elect those (the board of directors) with the ultimate authority to
make overall decisions and to monitor and replace, if necessary, the senior
supervisors carrying out these decisions. In this manner, the board will be
responsive to the interests of the shareholders and pursue the most wealth
maximizing actions for the corporation.168
Indeed, under this sort of thinking it is even possible to applaud the
whole vote buying idea of shareholder democracy. After all, if shareholders
are too numerous and rationally disengaged to make overall decisions for,
and carefully monitor what is going on at, their corporations, they are also
normally too numerous and rationally disengaged to organize opposition
seeking to oust underperforming directors and managers. It is easier to
follow the so-called “Wall Street rule” of selling your shares if you do not
like the management169—something that is much less practical for a citizen
dissatisfied with his or her government and that further accounts for few
corporate elections being contested. On the other hand, this creates the
opportunity for those who think they can better manage the corporation to
buy enough stock to gain control. Hence, vote buying through the purchase
of stock can lead to greater efficiency by replacing poor management with
better.170

b. Second Thoughts about Shareholder Interests
There has been considerable pushback against the view that giving
primacy to shareholder interests, at least as shareholders often perceive their
interests, produces the economically optimal decisions for corporations or
for society more broadly.
A common example involves the incentives for shareholders when a
corporation is at or near insolvency.171 If a corporation’s assets are less than,
or even barely in excess of, its debts, then losing further money essentially
only harms the creditors and not the shareholders. On the other hand,
any earnings in excess of the debts will go to the shareholders. Under this
circumstance, high risk investments (like bets at a roulette wheel) make
sense from the shareholders’ standpoint. This will be true even though such
investments have a net negative value (in that the magnitude of the possible
168
169
170
171

E.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
Econ. 301, 311 (1983).
E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 8, at 236.
E.g., Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 Va. L. Rev.
259, 265–66 (1967).
E.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150,
1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
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loss from the investment, multiplied by the probability of the loss, exceeds
the magnitude of the possible gain from the investment, multiplied by the
probability of the gain) and so the investments are inefficient from an overall
economic standpoint.
Examples of poor incentives for shareholders are not confined to
nearly insolvent corporations. Many of these examples involve so-called
“short-termism”172 or other myopic decisions that might have an immediately
favorable impact on the shareholders of a corporation but can have negative
consequences when viewed over a longer-term or broader economic
perspective. For example, tales of layoffs and moving plants in search of
lower labor costs can discourage employees at all corporations from investing
in developing firm-specific human capital (in other words, developing skills
which are not completely transferable to another company). This can result
in lower corporate efficiency across the economy even though the layoffs and
plant moving increased the immediate wealth for the shareholders of the
corporation that did it.173
More broadly, actions that favor the interests of shareholders over
others impacted by corporate activities might not be optimal when viewed
from a larger economic or social standpoint. Specifically, maximizing
corporate profits for the benefit of shareholders would normally appear to call
for lowering costs—including compensation and benefits for employees.174 It
also normally calls for increasing revenues, including by increasing prices
charged to consumers.175 In addition, it would call for taking advantage of
externalities, say by lowering expenditures on safety or pollution control
unless required by the government.176 Such actions can have negative
consequences in terms of income inequality and sustainability that outweigh
the gains to the shareholders when looked at in terms of broader economic
and societal consequences.
Not surprisingly, many expressing concern about the negative
economic or other consequences of giving primacy to shareholder interests
172

173
174
175

176

E.g., William Galston, Against Short-Termism, Democracy (2015), https://
democracyjournal.org/magazine/38/against-short-termism/; Roger L. Martin,
Yes, Short-Termism Really Is a Problem, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Oct. 9, 2015), https://hbr.
org/2015/10/yes-short-termism-really-is-a-problem.
See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 304–05 (1999).
E.g., Bodie, supra note 156, at 74.
Indeed, diversified shareholders presumably would prefer that corporations in which
they hold stock not compete with each other. E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Saying Yes:
Reviewing Board Decisions to Sell or Merge the Corporation, 44 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 437, 497
(2017).
E.g., Strine & Walter, supra note 7, at 380–81.
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are then led to express hostility to shareholder democracy177—including by
opposing reforms such as proxy access.178 Interestingly, however, few such
commentators appear to express opposition to democratic government in
general.

2. Legitimacy
While this might be an unfair comparison, both sides of the
economic-oriented narrative regarding corporate or shareholder democracy
can remind one a bit of the apologists for Mussolini, who said that he “made
the trains run on time.” Democracy does not necessarily find its justification
in utilitarian economic considerations. Admittedly, one could say that
business is all about economics. Yet, there is a democracy for its own sake
threaded in corporate governance thinking.

a. The Original Purpose for Elected Corporate Boards
Indeed, this corporate democracy for its own sake notion is far older
than the focus on economic outcomes. As mentioned earlier,179 the jointstock companies, like the East India Company, which are the forebears of
the modern corporation, evolved out of so-called regulated companies. The
regulated companies were little more than merchant guilds whose members
had the exclusive right to conduct trade between England and areas
such as the Baltic (for the Eastland Company) or Turkey (for the Levant
Company).180 The members of the regulated companies typically elected
boards of those who we would now refer to as directors.181 As the regulated
companies evolved into the earliest joint stock companies, this model of
an elected board went along for the ride—either as what started out as a
regulated company turned into a joint stock company or as the early joint
stock companies modeled the governance provisions in their charters on the
governance provisions of the regulated companies.182
177
178

179
180
181
182

See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 173, at 310–15 (favorably mentioning “practical and
legal obstacles” to shareholders using their voting power).
E.g., Yvan Allaire & Francois Dauphin, Who Should Pick Board Members? Proxy Access
by Shareholders to the Director Nomination Process, SSRN 29 (Nov. 5, 2015), https://ssrn.
com/abstract=2685790; Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the
Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 Bus. Law. 67, 70–71 (2003).
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
E.g., Davis, supra note 42, at 88–89, 97–98; Cawston & Keane, supra note 22, at 61.
E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of
Directors, 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 89, 117 (2004).
Id. at 115–22; T.S. Willan, The Early History of the Russia Company, 1553–1603,
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The regulated companies themselves, being essentially guilds, took
the elected board governance model commonly used by guilds,183 which
over time had replaced direct governance by all of the guild’s members
with decision making by elected representatives.184 Moreover, given the close
connection between the economic role and populace of medieval European
towns and the merchants, the merchant guilds were closely connected with
medieval European municipal governments.185 Hence, the parallel between
the guild boards and the town councils, which developed after medieval
towns, became too large for meetings of the entire townsfolk.186 Moreover,
to medieval European jurists, both guilds and towns were a universitates
(essentially, a corporation) and, as such, were subject to common norms of
governance with other corporations.187 These included political ideas and
practices also manifested in medieval European parliaments and in Church
councils.188
Among these political ideas and practices was the medieval
European preference for expressions of consensus when making decisions
impacting all members of the community.189 One manifestation of this
preference occurred when Canon Law jurists turned a Roman Law doctrine
of quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur (“what touches all is to be approved
by all”) from a technical rule involving co-tutorship into a broad principle of
governance.190 This principle applied not only to the Church, but to other
“corporations”—using the term in the broader sense of a collective group,
including guilds and towns191—and was invoked in the summonses sent by
kings demanding that representatives appear at a parliament.192 The role,
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

at 19–21 (1956).
E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 181, at 156–57.
E.g., id. at 158–60; Cyril O’Donnell, Origins of the Corporate Executive, 26 Bull. Bus. Hist.
Soc’y 55, 63 (1952).
E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 181, at 146–47.
Id. at 141–44; see also Susan Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities in Western
Europe 900-1300, at 195–96 (1984) (noting that smaller towns retained open
assemblies).
E.g., Antony Black, Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought
from the Twelfth Century to the Present 18–24 (1984).
Id. at 44.
E.g., Reynolds, supra note 186, at 302–05.
Brian Tierney, Medieval Canon Law and Western Constitutionalism, 52 Cath. Hist. Rev. 1,
13 (1966).
E.g., Black, supra note 187, at 73.
E.g., Summonses to the Parliament of November 1295, reprinted in Thomas N. Bisson,
Medieval Representative Institutions, Their Origins and Nature 147–48 (1973)
(reciting the doctrine that “what touches all should be approved by all” in setting
forth the purpose of the summons and commanding county, town, and ecclesial
representatives to attend).
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then, of a board, council, or parliament was to have representatives with
full power (plena potestas) grant the consent required on behalf of the broader
community.193
Indeed, it is fairly easy to see that consent of the governed, rather
than economic efficiency, represented the original purpose for boards when
we ask what exactly the board of a regulated company or guild did. These
boards obviously did not manage a business, or supervise those who did,
on behalf of passive investors. Rather, in addition to adjudicating disputes
involving the merchants, these boards adopted ordinances to regulate the
membership.194 For example, the board of the Eastland Company adopted
a regulation prohibiting members from “colouring” goods—in other words,
selling the goods of a nonmember merchant as a member’s own—thereby
circumventing the company’s monopoly.195 Hence, these boards reflected
the essentially democratic notion that the members of a group should elect
those who make decisions and rules governing the members of the group.

b. Contemporary Expressions
Even if elected board governance of corporations originated in
democratic notions of consent of the governed, one might ask what this
has to do with governance of the modern business corporation. In fact, the
notion of legitimacy through a democratically elected government remains
a thread in corporate governance thinking. One of the best articulations of
this sort of thinking is found in the Blasius opinion discussed earlier.196
The directors in Blasius argued that the court should apply the
deferential business judgment rule197 to their efforts blocking the plaintiff
193

194
195

196
197

Id. (stating that the knights sent to parliament are to have “full and sufficient power
for themselves and the community of aforesaid shire,” and the citizens and burghers
sent to parliament are to have such power “for themselves and the community of cities
and boroughs separately,” to do the business of parliament). It should be mentioned,
however, that the medieval European concept of representatives to grant consent on
behalf of the broader community did not necessarily mean that the representatives
were democratically elected.
E.g., Willan, supra note 182, at 19–20; Gevurtz, supra note 181, at 120.
E.g., Schmitthoff, supra note 71, at 82. Indeed, some of the ordinances adopted by the
boards of regulated companies or guilds did not involve the conduct of business at
all—as, for example, in the case of an ordinance prohibiting members of the Merchant
Adventurers (which had the exclusive right to trade between England and Calais) from
marrying women not born in England. Davis, supra note 42, at 80. Presumably, the
Merchant Adventurers’ marriage limitation was to “promote domestic tranquility.”
See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the meanings attached to the business judgment rule, see Gevurtz,
supra note 8, at 298–306.
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shareholder from obtaining majority control of the board. In rejecting this
argument, Chancellor Allen (who had a substantial influence on Delaware
corporate law despite not serving on the state’s Supreme Court) explained:
The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon
which the legitimacy of directorial power rests. . . .
It has, for a long time, been conventional to dismiss the stockholder
vote as a vestige or ritual of little practical importance. . . . Be that
as it may, however, whether the vote is seen functionally as an
unimportant formalism, or as an important tool of discipline, it is
clear that it is critical to the theory that legitimates the exercise of
power by some (directors and officers) over vast aggregations of
property that they do not own.198

Indeed, one wonders whether state legislatures would have enacted
laws allowing for general incorporation, particularly at a time in which such
laws reflected a fear of corporate power, without the patina of democratic
legitimacy provided by governance under an elected board.

III. Corporations and Democratic Governance of Society as a
Whole
A. Situating the Private Association within the Democratic Governance of Society
1. The Impact of Corporations on Individuals in Society
Many who express support for democracy in general nevertheless
might not much care about whether corporate governance adheres to
democratic values.199 Such a view explicitly or implicitly draws a distinction
between political entities (e.g., nations, states or provinces, cities) and private
associations such as corporations. Under this view, how private associations
choose to govern themselves is primarily a matter of private contracting
and does not impact the question of whether the governance of society is
democratic. In other words, this view rejects any linkage between the internal
and external aspects of corporations and democracy.
This view, however, overlooks the normal operation of human
societies. Human societies rarely exist as simply atomistic individuals living
198
199

Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
E.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and
Practice 143 (2008) (“While notions of shareholder democracy permit powerful
rhetoric, corporations are not New England town meetings. Put another way, we need
not value corporate democracy simply because we value political democracy.”).
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within political entities. Instead, societies consist of various associations
among individuals.200 In addition to families, this includes associations for
both non-economic (such as religious) and economic purposes (including
business corporations). The decisions of those governing such associations
can have as much or more impact on the lives of individuals as the decisions
of those in charge of political entities.
This is certainly the case with large corporations. The largest
firms, almost all of whom are corporations,201 produce most goods and
services in the United States.202 They employ the majority of the private
sector workers.203 They pollute the environment204 and cause innumerable
injuries.205 Their failure can bring down the economy.206

2. Democratic Consent or Accountability for Those Governing
Corporations
The fact that various associations, such as corporations, impact
the lives of individuals does not mean they undermine the democratic
200
201
202

203
204

205

206

E.g., William Little, Introduction to Sociology - 1st Canadian Edition 169–197
(2014),
http://solr.bccampus.ca:8001/bcc/items/debe8d05-dbdf-4cb8-80f987b547ea621c/1/?attachment.uuid=7471f3fc-1e00-4c98-aaf0-010b00d702f4.
See supra note 6.
E.g., James Manyika et al., A New Look at How Corporations Impact the Economy and
Households, McKinsey Glob. Inst. (May 31, 2021), https://www.mckinsey.com/
business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/a-new-look-at-howcorporations-impact-the-economy-and-households; see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood,
Markets and Democracy: The Illegitimacy of Corporate Law, 74 UMKC L. Rev. 41, 58 (2005)
(“Measured by the degree to which they affect our lives, corporate decisions designing
and delivering cars, clothes, word processors, telephone service or electricity have at
least as much impact as do most local governmental activities. In terms of coercion, it is
easier to escape local governmental taxation than to avoid paying fees to corporations
such as Microsoft, cable companies or major food processors; hospital bills are more
likely to threaten our way of life than governmental traffic tickets.”).
E.g., Andrew Lundeen & Kyle Pomerleau, Less Than One Percent of Businesses Employ Half
of the Private Sector Workforce, Tax Found. (Nov. 26, 2014), https://taxfoundation.org/
less-one-percent-businesses-employ-half-private-sector-workforce/.
E.g., Tess Riley, Just 100 Companies Responsible for 71% of Global Emissions, Study Says,
Guardian (July 10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2017/
jul/10/100-fossil-fuel-companies-investors-responsible-71-global-emissions-cdpstudy-climate-change (addressing greenhouse gas emissions).
See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence
of Market Manipulation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1420, 1422, 1467 (1999) (presenting as a case
study of market manipulation, the tobacco industry’s techniques to get consumers to
disregard the risk of smoking).
E.g., Richard A. Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of ’08 and the Descent
into Depression 269–70 (2009).
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governance of society unless they have an internal governance adhering to
democratic norms. Families commonly do not govern themselves under such
norms. Here is where one must consider the interaction of the internal and
the external. What makes the impact and governance of private associations
consistent with a democratic society is either (1) their internal governance
under democratic norms; (2) the ability of individuals to disassociate from
such associations and from the impact of the decisions of those in charge
of such associations; or (3) the prospect for intervention by democratically
elected governments of political entities when disassociation is an inadequate
remedy.
In other words, the internal governance of corporations is simply
one means for potentially giving democratic voice to those impacted by
the decisions of corporate management. If internal governance gives such
a democratic voice, then corporations serve as part of the democratic
governance of society, rather than constituting a threat to it. To look to
subnational political entities by analogy, this is why it is rare to hear assertions
that the State of California, because of its wealth and power, constitutes a
threat to democracy in the United States. After all, the government of the
State of California is democratically elected. So long as the democratically
elected officials do not take actions to undermine continued democratic
accountability, the mere fact that the state is wealthy and powerful does
not make it a threat to democracy.207 On the other hand, to the extent that
the internal governance of corporations does not provide democratic voice
to those impacted by the corporation, then one must look to the external
means of democratic consent or accountability.
Those inclined toward a laissez faire ideology focus on the ability of
individuals to either accept or avoid the impact of dealing with a corporation
by the choice to either contract or refrain from contracting with it.208 Put in
terms of democratic rather than economic values, individual choice through
contracting or refusing to do so provides the consent of, and accountability
to, the individuals potentially impacted by the decisions of those in charge
of corporations. Thus, it achieves the underlying democratic goal of consent
by, or accountability to, the governed.
The problem is that voluntary association and disassociation
often might not provide consent and accountability. An obvious example
is those harmed by corporate activities to which they did not agree, such
207
208

Indeed, if the mere wealth and power of a political entity makes it a threat to
democracy despite having a democratic government, then the United States itself is a
threat to democracy.
E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law 22–25 (1996); Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 164, at 777.
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as tort victims or the victims of environmental degradation caused by the
corporation’s activities. In many other instances, market failures, such as
limited realistic options in concentrated markets (for instance, those in
which network effects create dominant positions for some companies),209
other situations involving unequal bargaining power,210 or inaccurate or
insufficient information available to individuals dealing with corporations,211
can render choice illusory.
In these situations, the availability of intervention by the
democratically elected government of a political entity—whether this
is through tort liability, safety and environmental regulations, antitrust
enforcement, labor laws, or anti-fraud and mandatory disclosure laws—
restores democratic accountability. Hence, even Milton Friedman’s famous
essay,212 which argued that the job of corporate managers is solely to make
money for the shareholders, added the qualifier “while conforming to the
basic rules of the society [including] those embodied in law.”213
Needless to say, the appropriate line between government
intervention and leaving protections to private contracting is a subject on
which there long has been debate.214 From the standpoint of democratic
values, however, the key is not whether Milton Friedman or Paul Krugman
is right on where this line should fall. Rather, it is that democratically elected
governments, acting in accordance with democratic principles, make the
decision.
Here again, the internal meets the external in the relationship between
corporations and democracy. The persons in charge of corporations not only
make decisions affecting individuals impacted by corporate activities, but
they also make decisions about deploying corporate resources to influence
the government. This means that the non-democratic aspects of internal
209
210

211

212
213
214

E.g., Zingales, supra note 2, at 120–21.
E.g., Yosifon, supra note 10, at 1200–01 (“Workers, having made firm-specific
investments of their human capital and having made community-specific investments
in other areas of their lives, may find it impossible to punish, or credibly threaten
to punish, directors for such opportunistic conduct by exiting to other firms or labor
markets.”).
Id. at 1201 (“Corporations can also manipulate the design of their products or engage
in misleading advertising campaigns, distorting consumers’ risk perceptions or their
evaluation of other product attributes.”); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 205, at 1439
(discussing techniques companies successfully use to exploit consumer irrationality).
Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine-- The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profit, N.Y. Times (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/
a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html.
Id.
See generally Thomas O. McGarity, The Expanded Debate Over the Future of the Regulatory
State, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1463 (1996).
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corporate governance not only cut off democratic consent or accountability
through such internal governance for the corporation’s activities, but they
also cut off such consent or accountability for the corporation’s efforts to
influence government. Moreover, if such efforts are successful, then the
prospect of government intervention also might fail to restore democratic
consent and accountability. This brings us to Citizens United and corporate
speech.

B. The Debate about Corporate Speech
Much of the current concern about the anti-democratic influence of
corporations focuses on corporate rights to free speech and the Citizens United
decision.215 In this decision, the Supreme Court struck down the federal
ban on corporations making independent expenditures for “electioneering
communication.” In a nutshell, the court held that Congress could not bar
political speech simply because it came from a corporation.216 The result
is to seemingly cut off the instinctive approach of many of those worried
about excessive corporate influence on democratically elected governments,
which is to bar corporations from at least some political activities open to
individuals.
This, in turn, raises the question of whether the law can treat
corporate political speech differently from speech by individuals. When all
is said and done, there are essentially three arguments for doing so: one
doctrinal, one results-oriented policy, and one consistent with democratic
values.

1. The Corporate “Person” Distraction
A baseline doctrinal argument challenges whether corporations are
“persons” subject to the same protections under the First Amendment as
individuals.217 Specifically, corporations come into existence by an act of
government, not God, even if now carried out through easy compliance with
general incorporation statutes. Hence, the argument runs, rather than being
“endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights,” corporations
only possess those rights that the government finds it useful to give. This is
known as the concession theory.218 Under a simple-minded version of this
215
216
217
218

See supra note 6.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19 (2010).
E.g., Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 890–91.
E.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 Utah L. Rev. 1629, 1635
(2011).
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theory, the government can restrict free speech by corporations however
much it wants.219 While there are counter-theories and back and forth,220 the
problem with taking this argument to its logical extreme is that depriving
corporations of the ability to assert free speech claims would severely
endanger democracy.
After all, it was the New York Times Company which, in New York
Times Company v. Sullivan,221 claimed protection under the First Amendment
when the Montgomery Alabama Police Commissioner sued it for defamatory
statements contained in an advertisement published in the Times by
supporters of Martin Luther King, Jr. The Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment applied and a public official suing for defamation cannot
recover unless he or she shows that the defendant knew the statement was
false. The Court does not even discuss the fact that the New York Times
Company is a corporation. Limiting the ability of government officials to
stifle criticism by suing for defamation would seem to enhance democracy.
Excluding corporations from asserting this First Amendment protection
would leave out most publishers and news organizations.222
Another Supreme Court decision involving the New York Times
Company, as well as the Washington Post Company (also a corporation), is
New York Times Company v. United States.223 In this decision, the Supreme Court
rejected the government’s request for an injunction blocking the two papers’
publication of the secret “Pentagon Papers”—a report prepared for the
219
220

221
222

223

See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 6, at 358–59.
E.g., Pollman, supra note 218, at 1660–63 (discussing alternative arguments for corporate
constitutional rights, including the aggregate theory, under which corporations are
extended constitutional rights to protect the interests of their shareholders, and the real
entity theory, which asserts that corporations, like other human associations such as
nations, take on a life of their own and therefore should be able to assert constitutional
rights); see also Nikolas Bowie, Corporate Personhood v. Corporate Statehood: We the Corporations:
How American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 2009 (2019) (book
review) (arguing that the treatment of corporations as persons independent of their
shareholders has actually led the Supreme Court to provide fewer constitutional rights,
while decisions extending constitutional rights to corporations do so to protect the
interests of individuals).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
In fact, an overwhelming bulk of the media are owned by only a half-dozen corporations.
See Nickie Louise, These 6 Corporations Control 90% of the Media Outlets in America. The
Illusion of Choice and Objectivity, Tech Startups (Sept. 18, 2020), https://techstartups.
com/2020/09/18/6-corporations-control-90-media-america-illusion-choiceobjectivity-2020/. The major book publishers are generally corporations as well. See,
e.g., Devin Clemens, The Ten Largest Publishing Companies in the World, Tharawat Mag.
(Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.tharawat-magazine.com/facts/ten-largest-publishingcompanies/.
403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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Department of Defense which documented the duplicitous history of public
assurances by the United States government regarding the war in Vietnam.
Once again, the defendants’ status as corporations merited no attention in
extending free speech protection. Indeed, denying corporations the right to
challenge a prior restraint on speech would allow the government to block
disclosure it finds uncomfortable from the organs most likely to distribute
such information to the public.
Of course, one might distinguish protections of speech from
protections of “the press” or draw other distinctions based upon the
nature of the corporation or the nature of the speech.224 This, however,
renders broad discussion of the nature of corporate personhood and the
First Amendment into something of a red herring. Once the law crosses
the Rubicon of extending to some corporations, or corporations in some
contexts, free speech rights, there needs to be a principled basis for saying
when corporations will not enjoy such rights. Focusing on corporate
“personhood” hardly seems to provide this lodestar. Nor is it necessary, since
free speech cases draw all sorts of contextual distinctions in deciding when
the government has infringed the free speech rights of individuals (who are
clearly persons).225

2. The Corporate Wealth Argument
The common policy-oriented argument for limiting corporate
political speech is that the excessive influence over politicians and government
decisions that wealthy corporations can obtain through political expenditures
and corporate speech creates a danger to democratic governance
224

225

See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 431 n.57 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (distinguishing cases protecting
speech by newspapers on this basis); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
824 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“There can be little doubt that when a State
creates a corporation with the power to acquire and utilize property, it necessarily and
implicitly guarantees that the corporation will not be deprived of that property absent
due process of law. Likewise, when a State charters a corporation for the purpose of
publishing a newspaper, it necessarily assumes that the corporation is entitled to the
liberty of the press essential to the conduct of its business.”).
See, e.g., Leslie Gielow Jacobs, “Incitement Lite” for the Nonpublic Forum, 85 Brook. L. Rev.
149, 167 (2019) (discussing how “[t]he balance of government authority and individual
speech rights differs substantially” according to the type of property on which the
speech takes place); W. Robert Gray, Public and Private Speech: Toward a Practice of Pluralistic
Convergence in Free-Speech Values, 1 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev.1, 22–23 (1994) (citing multiple
cases such as Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), and Rankin v. McPherson, 483
U.S. 378 (1987), to discuss how context is important when considering whether the
government infringed upon an individual’s free-speech right).
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responsive to the interests of all Americans rather than the private greed of
corporations.226 This argument commonly features eye-popping figures on
the wealth of large corporations, as well as the amount of their expenditures
on political speech, and discussions of the influence of such speech in
advancing an agenda hostile to workers, consumers, the environment, and
so on.227 Sometimes, this is accompanied by a conspiratorial vision regarding
the broader tenacles of those advancing an aggressively pro-business and
anti-regulatory agenda through increasingly conservative courts and the
like.228
Unfortunately, this line of argument often smacks of “corporations
should not enjoy free speech when I do not like what they have to say.” Indeed,
those who worry about corporate advocacy against regulations addressing
worker pay and safety, the environment, or consumer protection, are not
often heard expressing qualms about corporations flexing their wealth in
order to promote racial equality or punish the intolerant among us.229
In any event, the fundamental problem with the corporate wealth
argument is that it fails to distinguish corporations from others who also
derive political power from wealth (e.g., billionaires). Actually, the bulk of
corporations are not that large.230 On the flip side, there is much writing on
the political influence of the so-called donor class of billionaires and other
wealthy individuals and families.231 While the very largest corporations have
226
227
228
229

230
231

E.g., Whitehouse with Stinnett, supra note 3, at 24–47; Strine, supra note 2, at 426.
E.g., Whitehouse with Stinnett, supra note 3, at 24–47; Strine, supra note 2, at 431
n.31, 439 n.60.
Strine, supra note 2, at 450–74. Incidentally, rather than being some anti-corporate
activist, Leo Strine, cited in these footnotes, is the former Chief Justice of the Delaware
Supreme Court and a person who devoted his career to matters of corporate law.
See, e.g., Chris Kromm, Why the HB2 Boycott of North Carolina Is Working, Facing S. (Apr.
29, 2016), https://www.facingsouth.org/2016/04/why-the-hb2-boycott-of-northcarolina-is-working (treating positively the decision by various businesses to boycott
North Carolina in response to state legislation constraining the choice of restrooms by
transgender individuals); Jonathan Turley, Free Speech Inc.: The Democratic Party Finds a New
but Shaky Faith in Corporate Free Speech, Hill (May 8, 2021), https://thehill.com/opinion/
judiciary/552461-free-speech-inc-the-democratic-party-finds-a-new-but-shaky-faithin (charging hypocrisy by Democrats supporting free speech rights of social media
corporations to exclude content by Trump). Just to show that neither side is innocent in
this sort of thing, those who defend corporate speech critical of government regulation
recently took a different view when it came to corporations attacking laws making
it more difficult to vote. Jennifer Rubin, Opinion, Republicans Defend Corporate Speech –
Unless It Supports Voting Rights, Wash. Post (Apr. 5, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/2021/04/05/republicans-defend-corporate-speech-unless-it-supportsvoting-rights/.
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010).
E.g., Paul Krugman, Why Do the Rich Have So Much Power?, N.Y. Times (July 1, 2020),
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more wealth than the richest individuals,232 it is not clear how much this
really matters. In other words, the wealthiest individuals have more than
enough money to influence politics.233 Moreover, wealthy individuals are
commonly such because they are shareholders in wealthy corporations.234
Hence, limiting political expenditures by corporations, but not wealthy
shareholders, might simply result in the same money coming from a different
bank account.
Beyond this, the corporate wealth argument creates serious difficulty
when it comes to media corporations. As discussed above when dealing with
the two New York Times decisions, speech by news media corporations may
be critical to maintaining a democracy. Yet, “the press” might also include
such dominant corporations as Facebook and Google.235 In addition, even
the most conventional news outlets are often part of larger corporate
groups whose political agendas could reach far beyond broadcasting the
news.236 Finally, recent years have shown that corporate influence can be as
powerful and potentially threatening to democracy when it simply consists
of broadcasting supposedly “fair and balanced” news as it can be when
consisting of overt political expenditures by a corporation that makes no
claim to be part of the press.237
Ultimately, defending Citizen United’s rejection of the corporate
wealth argument is not to discount the concern about money in politics.
Indeed, perhaps where the Court has gone wrong lies in an all-to-casual
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https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/opinion/sunday/inequality-america-paulkrugman.html (“A 2015 Times report found that at that point fewer than 400 families
accounted for almost half the money raised in the 2016 presidential campaign.”);
Benjamin I. Page et al., What Billionaires Want: The Secret Influence of America’s 100 Richest,
Guardian (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/oct/30/
billionaire-stealth-politics-america-100-richest-what-they-want.
E.g., Stine, supra note 2, at 439 n.60 (“[T]he ten wealthiest corporations in America
have total equity of $1.7 trillion, or roughly four times the net worth of the top ten
richest Americans ($488.3 billion).”).
See supra note 231.
See, e.g., Strine, supra note 2, at 438 n.58 (“[M]any large so-called ‘individual contributors’
[to campaigns and PACs] in fact control large private corporations from which they
can pull resources for political spending, and it may be that some possess voting control
over public companies.”).
See, e.g., Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1025 (2011)
(discussing meaning of the press). Keep in mind that New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), involved an advertisement placed in the Times and that Facebook
and Google’s primary revenues come from advertisements.
See Louise, supra note 222. For example, ABC is owned by Disney, CNN is owned by
AT&T, and NBC is owned by Comcast.
E.g., David Brock et al., The Fox Effect: How Roger Ailes Turned a Network
into a Propaganda Machine (2012).
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equation of spending money with any other form of speech in which more
is better.238 Ignored is the concern that allowing those with greater wealth to
have greater political influence seems contrary to the democratic value of
equality among voters. Nevertheless, this concern is not limited to corporate
speech.

3. Who Decides What a Corporation Says?
The one thing regarding speech that is undeniably different between
a corporation and an individual is that a corporation cannot actually decide
what it is going to say; instead, those in charge of the company make that
decision. This returns us to the interplay of the internal and the external
with respect to the relationship between corporations and democracy.
Specifically, the undemocratic nature of corporate governance means a lack
of democratic consent or accountability not only for decisions regarding
corporate conduct, but also for decisions about employing corporate
resources to lobby against government intervention that would restore
democratic accountability.239

a. Speech Advancing Idiosyncratic Views of those in Charge
The ability of those in charge of a corporation to dictate the
company’s political speech creates potential issues in two basic contexts:
one being rather trivial, the other presenting a fundamental issue regarding
democracy. The former involves corporate speech in favor of what, for
want of better terminology, we can label the idiosyncratic views of those in
charge of the corporation. Idiosyncratic in this context does not mean that
the views are not widely held. Rather, this term is intended to capture the
essential notion that the views are not particularly relevant to the corporate
enterprise.240
238
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240

E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (“A restriction on the amount of money a
person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the
depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”).
E.g., Pollman, supra note 10, at 675.
Of course, the imaginative can often conjure up some correlation between the
corporate enterprise and the subject of any corporate speech—as done in a somewhat
different context by an often-cited court opinion finding a corporate purpose for a
manufacturing company’s cash contributions to Princeton University. A.P. Smith Mfg.
Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953). Realistically, however, there are situations
in which the corporation’s position reflects the happenstance that the individuals in
charge wish to advance a particular view, but there is nothing inherent in the nature of
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This is the type of speech addressed in First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti.241 In this decision, the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts
statute that prohibited banks and business corporations from spending
money to influence referenda other than those that affected the property
or business of the corporation. This statute seemed to be an obvious effort
to force management of a business corporation to stick to business when it
came to political expenditures.
In fact, the issues raised in this context are rather minor in the greater
scheme of corporations and democracy. For one thing, it is not necessary to
address the failings in corporate or shareholder democracy in order to address
these issues. Even if one assumes that corporate or shareholder democracy
perfectly matches democratic values and practices, there are still likely to
be minority shareholders who might object to a particular idiosyncratic
political position being advanced at corporate expense. The question is
whether states have the power to protect such minority shareholders from
having their corporation’s assets used to subsidize such views.
Since one of the traditional functions of state corporate law has been
to protect minority shareholders from having the corporation’s assets used
by those in charge, even when supported by the majority of shareholders,
for purposes beyond that for which the minority shareholders signed up
(conducting lawful business),242 an affirmative answer to this question should
be easy.243 The Court nevertheless held that the particular statute before the

241
242
243

the corporation’s business or in the interests of whoever would run the corporation’s
business that commonly would have produced the same corporate speech if someone
else was in charge.
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
This is the ultra vires doctrine. E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 8, at 226–32.
The common response to this concern is that no one forces an individual to purchase
stock in a particular company. E.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652,
686–87 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Hence, if individuals do not like the views of
those in charge, they do not need to be shareholders. Id. Yet, this view allows those
who gain power over a corporation to force investors to conflate business (whether
the corporation is a profitable investment) with political decisions. This implicates
the statutory purpose of a business corporation. State corporation statutes (taking
corporation in its broadest sense as not limited to business corporations) generally
provide a menu of choices as to the purpose of the corporation that organizers can
establish. See, e.g., Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 497, 509–11 (1981) (discussing permissible purposes for non-profit corporations
under state law). This includes corporations formed for various non-profit purposes—
religious, charitable, educational, and the like. Under these circumstances, what is wrong
with the state insisting that those who chose to form a business rather than another type
of corporation, and sought investors’ money based upon this characterization, not
force prospective shareholders into making their investment decisions based on factors
other than business? This is not to say that states should curb this sort of corporate
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Court in Bellotti infringed on the First Amendment because it was over- and
under-inclusive relative to this goal.244
In any event, the practical impact of corporate speech which falls into
this context is relatively small. Because the positions taken by the corporation
in this context, by definition, flow from the views of whoever happens to
be in charge, these positions will exhibit a certain randomness.245 This, in
turn, suggests less grounds for worry about undue corporate influence over
government. So, for example, positions urged by corporations with more
socially progressive management will offset positions urged by corporations
with more socially conservative management and so the impact is simply
more speech rather than pushing governmental action in a single direction.
While one might object to the ability of some individuals to gain greater
influence by using the money of other people who might not subscribe to
their views, this does not appear to present a significant structural threat to
governance of the overall society in accordance with democratic values.246

244

245

246

speech. Rather, it simply suggests there is nothing untoward in states doing so.
Indeed, this decision might be more about how the law is supposed to protect dissenting
minority shareholders from management using corporate resources to fund personally,
rather than business, motivated political speech, than it is about whether the law can
do so. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First
Amendment, 91 Yale L.J. 235 (1981). Specifically, the Court suggests that minority
shareholders might seek such protection by filing a derivative suit. This, however, leaves
things to the case-by-case judicial determinations that corporation statutes sought to
reduce through provisions such as those allowing corporations to make charitable
contributions. E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 8, at 229. The result of Bellotti is to block the
legislature from creating this sort of bright line clarity (which is always going to be
over—or under—inclusive) on the negative side for political expenditures. See 435 U.S.
765.
See, e.g., David Gelles, Delta and Coca-Cola Reverse Course on Georgia Voting Law, Stating
‘Crystal Clear’ Opposition, N.Y. Times (Mar. 31, 2021) (updated Apr. 5, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/03/31/business/delta-coca-cola-georgia-voting-law.html
(discussing Delta Airlines’ and Coca-Cola’s changing position regarding Georgia’s law
making voting more difficult); Matthew Futterman, NFL Owners Clashed in Private Over
Protests, Wall St. J. (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nfl-owners-clashedover-protests-1506974582 (discussing disagreements between owners of NFL football
teams regarding player protests during the national anthem).
One other context involving corporate political speech illustrated by recent events
occurs where the speech is not aimed at influencing listeners to support a particular
position, but rather at maintaining corporate goodwill by coming out in support of
positions popular with prospective customers or employees. Since the point of such
advertising is simply to say that the corporation agrees with what it thinks the listener
already believes, rather than to sway the listener’s political views, the impact of such
expenditures on democratic governance is even more trivial than corporate speech in
favor of the idiosyncratic views of its management.
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b. Speech Advancing the Interests of those Structurally in Charge of
Corporations over the Interests of those not
The context in which corporate speech potentially implicates the
overall democratic governance of society is where the speech favors the
interests of those groups structurally in charge of corporations (management
and majority shareholders) at the expense of those with less or no voice
through corporate or shareholder democracy but who nevertheless are
impacted by the corporation and contribute toward its wealth. In other
words, the problem flows from the interaction of the internal (the failure
of corporate or shareholder democracy to reflect democratic values) with
the external (corporate speech seeking to block democratic governments of
political entities from protecting the interests of those lacking voice through
corporate or shareholder democracy).
In fact, there are several overlapping threads to this concern, hints
of which are buried in the muddled distortion argument in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce.247 In Austin, the Court upheld a Michigan prohibition of
corporations making independent expenditures in support of, or opposition
to, candidates for office—a result the Court overruled in Citizens United. In
upholding this statute, the Court in Austin pointed to the “distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support
for the corporation’s political ideas.” 248
At first glance, this seems to be just a gussied-up form of the
corporate wealth argument. Specifically, corporations, or indeed anyone
with greater wealth,249 might use their wealth to obtain influence that has no
correlation to the public support for the ideas being advanced—in contrast
with small dollar donations to political causes in which the amount of money
available is roughly proportionate to the number of individuals who support
the cause. Yet, this understates the matter.
It is not simply that the wealth available does not correlate with
public support of the cause advanced by those in charge of the corporation
in this context. Rather, the problem is that the amount of corporate money
available to seek political influence in this context is likely to be inversely
proportionate to the support of the corporation’s cause from those who are
247
248
249

494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
Id.
Justice Marshall’s majority opinion tries to distinguish the use of corporate wealth by
arguing that the law (corporate personhood, transferable interests, and limited liability)
facilitates such wealth. Yet, laws allowing inheritance and, even more fundamentally,
that protect property rights, are necessary for the existence of inherited wealth.
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contributing to the corporation’s wealth but lack a say in its governance.
Keep in mind that this context involves lobbying for policies that
favor those in charge of the corporation over others—such as employees,
consumers, involuntary victims of the corporation’s activities—who also
contributed to the corporation’s wealth. Hence, the larger number of
individuals from whom those in charge of the corporation can extract
corporate wealth, the more wealth they have available to lobby against
government efforts to intervene on behalf of such individuals. Moreover,
the more successful such lobbying is in preventing government intervention
to protect those lacking either voice through internal corporate governance
or effective avenues to avoid dealing with the corporation, the more wealth
those in charge of the corporation have available to lobby.
Worse yet, corporate lobbying, if it results in government
facilitated monopoly—as, for example, through patent protection of critical
pharmaceuticals—not only blocks the government from intervening on
behalf of those lacking voice through internal corporate governance but
also limits democratic accountability through disassociation. Indeed, the
more monopoly power corporations possess, the more wealth corporations
may obtain to influence government and the more corporations influence
government, the more monopoly power they may obtain to increase their
wealth and dictate the lives of those who lack a voice in their governance.250
All told, to indulge in a bit of hyperbole, it is as if a thieves’ guild
used their ill-gotten loot to lobby government to reduce the funding of police
or to pass laws banning the manufacture and sale of locks.

C. The Choice
This brings us back again to the complex dualisms of corporations
and democracy. In this instance, the dualism arises in a pair of tools
to address the potentially undemocratic impact of corporations on the
governance of society. Following the theme of this article, one tool deals
with the corporation’s relations with external government, while the other
deals with internal corporate governance. Further dualism arises in the
potential for unintended consequences in both of these approaches, which is
reminiscent of the paradoxes regarding corporations and democracy found
in the history of corporate law.

250

E.g., Zingales, supra note 2, at 119–20 (referring to this as the “Medici vicious circle”).
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1. Curbing Corporate Political Influence
Much writing,251 and even more political posturing,252 on the topic
of corporations and democracy advocate actions external to the corporation
to curb corporate political influence. Given the attitude of a majority of
the Supreme Court toward curbs on corporate political activities and the
difficulties of amending the Constitution, this discussion can take on a sort
of science fiction quality.253 Nevertheless, it is the purview of a law review
article to talk about what should be and not just what is.
Consistent with the theme of this article, the lodestar of our
discussion is pursuing democracy and democratic values. Hence, the
object is not to curb corporate political influence in order to advance an
agenda aiding employees, consumers, the environment or so on because
this is a better social outcome. Rather, it is to ensure democratic consent
and accountability when neither internal corporate governance nor the
individual ability to deal or not with the corporation provides such. This
means we must evaluate the impact of corporate political influence not
simply by whether it succeeds or fails,254 but rather by whether it interferes
251
252

253
254

See supra note 3.
E.g., Press Release, Senator Bernie Sanders, Saving American Democracy Amendment
(Dec. 8, 2011), https://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/recent-business/savingamerican-democracy-amendment; S.J. Res. 33, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011) (proposing
constitutional amendment, by Senator Sanders, to overturn Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), by declaring that constitutional rights do not
belong to for-profit corporations).
But see Levitt, supra note 6 (discussing openings left by Citizens United).
Of course, if corporate wealth rarely translates into political influence sufficient
to change government policy, then there is no reason to discuss whether corporate
political influence is a threat to democracy. In fact, there is some debate about the
degree to which corporate or any other wealth translates into political influence. While
this is often asserted by those worried about the political influence of corporations,
see generally Zingales, supra note 2, at 122–25 (giving examples), or worried about
money in politics more generally, critics can point to counterexamples of expensive
campaigns or other efforts to influence government that failed in their objectives. E.g.,
Meg Fowler, The Most Expensive, Failed Primary Campaigns, ABC News (Jan. 31, 2012),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/expensive-failed-primary-campaigns-past-decade/
story?id=15483044 (discussing five campaigns which each raised over $50M but
lost their elections); Christopher Ingraham, Somebody Just Put a Price Tag on the 2016
Election. It’s a Doozy., Wash. Post (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonk/wp/2017/04/14/somebody-just-put-a-price-tag-on-the-2016-electionits-a-doozy/ (“Clinton’s unsuccessful campaign ($768 million in spending) outspent
Trump’s successful one ($398 million) by nearly 2 to 1.”). There are also organized
groups lobbying against corporate positions, such as unions and consumer groups.
E.g., Yosifon, supra note 10, at 1203–04 (concluding, however, that such efforts are less
effective than corporate lobbying). Ultimately, whether corporate or other wealth can
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with decision making consistent with democratic values.
It turns out that the corporate part of corporate political influence
might be largely irrelevant when it comes addressing this inquiry. To see
why, consider the various ways in which corporate political activity could be
contrary to democratic norms.
The one on which there is the most agreement is corruption255—
in other words, seeking influence through payments or actions beneficial
to government officials. With a sufficient quid pro quo this can meet the
definition of bribery;256 but it can be problematic even if falling short of
that.257 Getting into a discussion of corruption, campaign finance and the
like is well beyond the scope of this article. Fortunately, it is also unnecessary.
This is because it is difficult to understand why the individual versus corporate
source of a potentially corrupt action should make any difference.258
The use of greater wealth to gain greater political influence raises an
issue beyond simply the prospect for corruption. In a society with unequally
distributed wealth, the ability of those with greater wealth to have greater
influence arguably offends the democratic value of equality among voters
and, many argue, endangers continued democratic government.259 The

255
256
257

258

259

yield political influence is an empirical question, which this article will assume to be the
case at least to some degree. Without delving into the empirical evidence, there are a
couple of grounds to support this assumption. The obvious is that those whose money
and elections are at stake must think it works. The other is that the Supreme Court’s
protection of such expenditures under the First Amendment would be rather pointless
if the Court did not assume such expenditures mattered.
E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25–27 (1976) (using interest in preventing corruption
to justify limiting campaign contributions).
Id. at 27.
E.g., Khadija Lalani, McDonnell v. United States: Legalized Corruption and the Need for
Statutory Reform, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. Online 29, 41–50 (2018) (discussing whether
actions not technically within the definition of bribery should nevertheless be banned
as corrupt).
To illustrate, consider the corrupting influence of employment of former government
officials by those they regulated while in government (the “revolving door” problem).
See Tom McGinty, SEC ‘Revolving Door’ Under Review, Wall St. J. (June 16, 2010),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703280004575309061471494980
(discussing the revolving door problem in the context of SEC employment). It should
hardly matter if such employment is by a corporation or by a law firm organized as an
LLP, which firm represents those regulated by the agency at which the former official
worked.
E.g., World Social Report 2020: Inequality in a Rapidly Changing World, U.N. Dep’t Econ. &
Soc. Affs. 48–51 (2020), https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/
uploads/sites/22/2020/02/World-Social-Report2020-FullReport.pdf;
Sanford
Lakoff, Inequality as a Danger to Democracy: Reflections on Piketty’s Warning, 130 Pol. Sci. Q.
425 (2015). There are a couple of arguments as to why greater influence by those with
greater wealth, irrespective of corruption, not only is inconsistent with the democratic
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acceptance of these arguments is much more contentious.260 Fortunately,
again, it is unnecessary to get into this debate. While large corporations are
wealthy, they are not unique in that regard.261
This article discussed above a problem that does, at first glance, seem
to arise from corporations. Specifically, those in charge of a corporation can
use the wealth generated by its business to lobby government against the
interests of those who are also contributing to this wealth but who are not
in charge. In this manner, those in charge might be able to use their control
over wealth to which others have voluntarily or involuntarily contributed in
order to escape any democratic accountability to those impacted by their
decisions and who helped create this wealth.
This, however, is not a problem limited to corporate expenditures.
For one thing, it arises with all businesses regardless of whether they operate
in corporate or non-corporate form. Moreover, to the extent that those
controlling corporations (managers, majority shareholders, or shareholders
more generally) personally obtain money from the corporation through
dividends, stock buybacks, compensation packages, or otherwise, they
still could use income to which others have contributed in order to lobby
government for actions favoring their interests over the interests of others
impacted by their decisions and who helped create this wealth.262
All of this is to suggest that Citizens United’s rejection of categorical
treatment of corporations when it comes to political speech is not the
problem. Indeed, in many ways it might be the solution. If one could limit
(despite Buckley) the use of wealth in political speech, placing corporations
within the same limit as any individual would remove the advantage of
corporations which hold more wealth than individuals. At the same time,
placing individuals under the cap imposed on corporations more completely
addresses the problem of using wealth to lobby against the interests of those

260
261
262

value of equality among voters but also presents a long-term danger to continued
democracy. The first raises the prospect of a spiral in which greater political influence
by the wealthy leads to greater income inequality, which, in turn, leads to even greater
political influence by the wealthy. Ultimately, this can result in a de facto oligarchy. In
addition, widespread recognition of the overwhelming influence that the wealthy enjoy
over government can weaken support for democracy among the broader electorate
and fuel the rise of autocrats.
E.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49 (rejecting equality argument).
See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
Admittedly, this might involve tax disadvantages relative to the corporation using its
money.
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who also contributed to its creation but have no voice in its use.
In fact, one might argue that the problem of using corporate (or,
more broadly, business) income to lobby against the interests of those who
contributed to its creation but have no voice in its use can justify some cap
on the use of money in political speech even if one does not accept the
voter equality rationale. Unfortunately, there is a degree of circularity in this
argument. This is because the thieves’ guild metaphor used earlier begs the
question.
This metaphor assumes that various parties contributing to the
wealth under the control of the stockholder majority and corporate
management, like the thieves’ victims, not only lack a democratic voice
through internal corporate governance, but also lack democratic consent and
accountability through their ability to deal or not deal with the corporation.
Hence, a predicate question from a democratic values standpoint is whether
some externality, market failure, or the like exists—a topic on which there
is often a difference of opinion in specific situations.263 Moreover, even if
there is some externality or market failure removing democratic consent or
accountability through individual choice, this does not mean that decisions
by those in charge of corporations were necessarily contrary to the interests
of other corporate stakeholders or that government action would be better
for them. Again, these are questions on which there is often a difference of
opinion in specific situations.264
Hence, limiting the ability of those in charge of corporations to use
corporate wealth to lobby against regulation or the like, on the ground that
this is a misuse of wealth against the interests of nonconsenting parties who
contributed to its creation, to some extent curbs the ability of those in charge
of corporations to make the case that this is not true in the situation at hand.
The result could be that instead of promoting democratic decision making,
we might be interfering with it. On the other hand, there is a difference
between allowing expenditures to make one’s case and rewarding those able
to prevail in an unlimited spending arm’s race by using money extracted
from the opposition in the race. In other words, there is a difference between
barring for-profit corporations from some types of political speech (as in
Citizens United) and imposing reasonable caps on how much one can spend.

263
264

E.g., Ryan Bourne, How ‘Market Failure’ Arguments Lead to Misguided Policy, Cato Inst.
(Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/how-market-failure-argumentslead-misguided-policy.
Id.
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2. Democratizing Corporate Democracy
The alternate approach looks to the internal governance of
corporations. It takes advantage of the separation of ownership and control
embedded in the corporate governance model of an elected board in
order to institute reforms that might be more difficult in businesses, such
as partnerships, in which the owners personally govern.265 The goal is to
have corporate governance follow democratic values. This would render
government intervention to protect those lacking voice through internal
corporate governance unnecessary to assuring democratic accountability.
To pursue this alternative, we need to address the anti-democratic
features in current corporate election mechanics, such as the lack of access to
the corporation’s proxy solicitation by nominees other than those picked by
the incumbent directors. More fundamentally (and challenging) is to end the
pay-to-play essence of corporate or shareholder democracy. This requires
extending the right to vote for corporate directors to non-shareholders who
are impacted by the decisions of directors.
In fact, a number of countries do this to some extent. Their laws
grant employees the right to elect a certain number of the directors. This
is commonly referred to as co-determination because both shareholders
and employees determine the composition of the board and thus have a
voice in the overall governance of the corporation. Germany pioneered codetermination laws, which are also found in a number of other European
countries266 and China.267 Such laws typically allow employees to elect a
minority of the corporation’s directors (such as one-third); albeit employees
elect one-half of the directors in the largest German companies.268 Perhaps
prompted by proposals made by Senator Elizabeth Warren and others
during the 2020 election campaign,269 some scholars have recently advocated
265

266
267

268
269

See, e.g., Revised Unif. P’ship Act § 401(h) (Unif. L. Comm’n 2021) (providing partners
with equal rights to participate in management unless otherwise provided in partnership
agreement). This raises the question of whether corporate governance reform will lead
to regulatory arbitrage through choice of non-corporate forms of business. See, e.g.,
Dammann & Eidenmueller, supra note 2 (manuscript at 67) (listing countries that also
require governing boards with worker representation for limited liability companies).
Dammann & Eidenmueller, supra note 2 (manuscript at 67–70, 72–73) (listing codetermination laws in Europe).
E.g., Jiong Deng, Note, Building an Investor-Friendly Shareholder Derivative Lawsuit System
in China, 46 Harv. Int’l L.J. 347, 353 (2005). Interestingly, there were some earlier
experiments with voluntary co-determination in the United States. E.g., Sarah C. Haan,
The Corporation’s Political Purpose, in Research Handbook on Corporate Purpose and
Personhood 299 (Elizabeth Pollman & Robert B. Thompson eds., 2021).
See supra note 264.
E.g., Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018).
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adoption of co-determination for corporations in the United States.270
While co-determination would move corporate governance toward
more democratic norms, it does not fully address the pay-to-play system.
Co-determination, at least as adopted by other countries so far, never gives
employees as much power on the board as the shareholders.271 More broadly,
this leaves out a voice in corporate governance for others impacted by the
decisions of those in charge of corporations. This includes consumers,
lenders, and the overall community in which the corporation operates.
In their article arguing for co-determination,272 Grant Hayden and
Matthew Bodie attempt to distinguish employees and shareholders from
these other interested groups based upon the criteria of how much stake
the group has in the corporation and the administrative practicality of
determining eligibility to vote. On the other hand, the existence of various
consumer governed cooperatives—such as mutual insurance companies,273
credit unions,274 consumer coop stores275—illustrates that it is mechanically
possible in some situations for consumers to have a voice.
From time to time, corporate law scholars have floated proposals
for corporate boards composed of directors representing multiple
constituencies.276 At this point, complexity increases exponentially. For
example, who would vote for the directors representing those potentially
injured by corporate pollution?277
270
271
272
273

274

275
276
277

Dammann & Eidenmueller, supra note 2; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 9.
Even for the largest German corporations in which workers elect half the board, the
shareholder-elected directors pick the board’s chair, who gets a tie-breaking vote. E.g.,
Franklin A. Gevurtz, Disney in a Comparative Light, 55 Am. J. Compar. L. 453, 474 (2007).
Hayden & Bodie, supra note 9.
See Patricia Born et al., Organizational Form and Insurance Company Performance: Stocks
versus Mutuals, in The Economics of Property-Casualty Insurance 167, 167–68
(David F. Bradford ed., 1998) (explaining that mutual insurance companies, in which
the customers (policy holders) own the corporation and elect the board of directors,
accounted for twenty-five percent of overall property-casualty premiums in the United
States in 1991).
See Benjamin J. Richardson, Fiduciary Relationships for Socially Responsible Investing:
A Multinational Perspective, 48 Am. Bus. L.J. 597, 604 (2011) (“In theory, the most
democratically governed financial institutions are credit unions. Organized
as cooperatives, they are owned by their members who share equally in their
governance . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
E.g., REI Board of Directors, REI, https://www.rei.com/about-rei/board-of-directors
(last visited Mar. 15, 2022) (“REI is the nation’s largest consumer co-operative. . . . [A]
board of directors selected from REI’s membership oversees the company.”).
E.g., Yosifon, supra note 10, at 1237; Kent Greenfield, The Failure of Corporate
Law: Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities 149 (2006).
One proof of the difficulty of figuring this all out is that such proposals typically float a
few ideas rather than explaining how this would all work. Greenfield, supra note 276.
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In any event, this still leaves the problem of voting in proportion to
stock, rather than one-person, one-vote. Perhaps the law could mandate a
one-person, one-vote system when it comes to voting by shareholders. Not
only is this the rule barring agreement to the contrary for partnerships,278
but it was also the system for many early corporations.279
Actually, shareholder voting by the amount of stock owned versus
one-person, one-vote will not matter as much in a corporation whose board
is elected by multiple constituencies rather than just by the shareholders.
This is because the primary practical impact of voting by shares rather than
one-person, one-vote occurs in the corporation with a majority or otherwise
controlling shareholder. Under the current corporate governance system,
control by a majority shareholder looks more like autocratic or dictatorial
rule than what comes to mind when speaking of shareholder democracy. In
a system in which shareholders no longer control the majority of the board,
such autocracy is no longer a given.280
One could avoid many of the complexities of multi-stakeholder
elected boards by having the government appoint those in charge of
businesses over a certain size—in other words, nationalization or socialism.
The common objection is that government control of corporations often
leads to politically motivated or outright corrupt decisions, lack of innovation,
and economic inefficiency.281
Staying with the focus of this article on corporations and democracy,
the overlap of nationalization or socialism with non-democratic or outright
totalitarian regimes282 raises an obvious concern. Of course, correlation
278
279

Revised Unif. P’ship Act § 401(f) (Unif. L. Comm’n 2021).
E.g., Dunlavy, supra note 86 (discussing voting arrangements in the early corporations
in the United States); Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before
1800, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 149, 156–57 (1888) (describing the evolution in voting in the
East India Company from the original one-member, one-vote to voting in proportion
to shares in the joint stock).
280 Conversely, a one-person, one-vote system might allow other corporate stakeholders to
gain power in corporate elections without expanding the franchise beyond those who
own stock. This is because it opens the prospect for employees or other stakeholders
to gain significant votes without unrealistic expenditures to buy stock. Ratner, supra
note 86, at 34. Incidentally, illustrating the potential for unintended consequences, oneperson, one-vote eliminates the ability of corporations to operate through subsidiaries
other than those that are wholly-owned—which may or may not be a bad thing. See id.
281 E.g., Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, J. Econ. Persps., Fall 1998, at 133.
282 E.g., Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 Fordham L. Rev.
2917, 2918–19 (2012) (“[G]overnment-controlled firms account for about 80 percent
of the market capitalization in China [and] 60 percent in Russia . . . .”). These figures,
of course, post-date the more extreme government ownership in the Soviet Union or
Maoist China.
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is not causation and so government control over corporations in many
notorious dictatorial regimes does not prove that such socialism promotes
dictatorial regimes as opposed to the other way around. This is more so
since government control of many large firms is also found in democratic
countries.283 In any event, it would unduly extend the length of this article to
address the arguments by those such as Hayek that government control over
major industries inevitably leads to undemocratic governments.284
All told, any effort to democratize corporate governance by
attacking the pay-to-play system raises complex questions and the potential
for unintended consequences. Accordingly, it is useful to keep in mind that
human institutions are imperfect, and democracy is commonly a matter of
more versus less. Hence, much as the history of democracy in general is
a history of expanding voting rights to different groups, expanded voting
rights in corporations might start with co-determination and gradually work
to include other stakeholders.

Conclusion
The relationship between corporations and democracy involves
both the internal governance of corporations and the external impact of
corporations on the overall governance of society. This stems from the reality
that those in charge of corporations make decisions that significantly impact
individuals in society. If the governance of society is to be truly democratic,
then those making decisions for corporations must have some consent by or
accountability to the individuals impacted by their decisions.
Despite some democratic features, corporate or shareholder
democracy as currently conceived is inconsistent with fundamental
democratic values and thus fails at this task—a function perhaps of economic
utilitarianism prevailing over democratic ideals. The ability of individuals to
deal or refuse to deal with a particular corporation provides such consent and
accountability in many, if not the bulk, of instances. Nevertheless, externalities
and market failures leave significant gaps. In this event, the availability of
intervention by a democratically elected government of a political entity
is necessary to restore accountability. Here is the real democratic deficit
potentially created by Citizens United: if those controlling corporations, who
are not democratically accountable through internal corporate governance,
can make unlimited use of corporate resources to influence government
against such intervention, they could also lack accountability through the
283
284

E.g., id. at 2948 (“By 1977, nineteen (38 percent) of the top fifty largest industrial
companies in Europe were state-owned . . . .”).
E.g., Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944).
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actions of democratically elected governments of political entities.
For corporations to be part of, rather than antithetical to, the
democratic governance of society, we face a choice: either there should
be some cap on the use resources generated by the corporation to lobby
against government intervention protecting the interests of those lacking
representation through corporate democracy, or else we should reform
corporate democracy to be consistent with democratic values—or perhaps
a bit of both.

